US helping India keep tabs on Chinese subs in Indian Ocean

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US helping India keep tabs on Chinese submarines in Indian Ocean

Sandeep Unnithan  New Delhi, January 26, 2015 | UPDATED 21:21 IST

Type 091 Han-class submarine. (Photo: Wikipedia) The United States is regularly updating India on Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean. Last month, a US drone picked up a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine on the surface off Yemen. The information was relayed to the security establishment in New Delhi's South Block. China's deployment of submarines-three in the past year-in the Indian Ocean have worried Indian planners.
This intelligence cooperation with the US assumes significance in the light of the first-ever US-India joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region unveiled in New Delhi by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Modi, on January 25. China was not mentioned, but the vision document alluded to it by affirming 'the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.'
Indian intelligence officials say they are keen on intelligence relating to terrorism emanating from Pakistan on its western borders and Chinese military activities.
Defence officials in New Delhi said that the Type 091 Han-class was 'running on the surface' accompanied by an escort which appeared to be a replenishment ship. The elderly 1970s vintage Han class attack submarine, is believed to be part of the 19th anti piracy task force that has been in the Gulf of Aden since December 10. This is the third such deployment of a submarine by the PLAN since 2013. Earlier, the docking of a Song-class submarine in Colombo in September and November last year created ripples in New Delhi. The PLAN terms these submarine deployments as routine and part of its anti-piracy patrols, an assertion that naval planners take with a pinch of salt.
Jayadeva Ranade, former joint secretary R&AW expects intelligence on China, particularly naval intelligence, as one area where both India and the US could gainfully cooperate. "The information supplied regarding the Chinese submarine in Colombo and later in the Indian Ocean are examples. I'm sure there is more that has been shared by the US about the route taken by the submarine, capabilities displayed, but I am not too sure whether the exchange of intelligence regarding our land borders with China has increased," he says.

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-helping-india-keep-tabs-chinese-submarines-in-indian-ocean/1/415420.html

The catastrophic 26/11 miss: how the navy and coast guard missed the LeT vessel despite CIA tip-off

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January 19, 2015

The coastal shadow

The Coast Guard's interception of the mystery boat off Gujarat is rooted in its futile search for the Lashkar-e-Taiba vessel that left Mumbai terrorised on 26/11

Sandeep Unnithan   |    |   January 8, 2015 | UPDATED 08:37 IST

Illustration by SAURABH SINGH


A mystery trawler fishing for trouble on the maritime border between India and Pakistan. A four-member crew said to have set fire to their boat to avoid capture. Hints that the interception of the suspected trawler off Gujarat on December 31 had averted a Mumbai 26/11-style attack gained credence when Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar insisted on January 5 that terrorists were on board. Security forces, Parrikar said, had done "the right job at the right time".
Coast Guard officials say the incident validates their new post-26/11 posture on coastal security. Navy and Coast Guard patrols boarded over 45,000 vessels along the Indian coast last year looking for security threats. "We have now demonstrated our capability to carry out intelligence-based operations, to swiftly shadow and intercept targets on the fringes of our Exclusive Economic Zone," a Coast Guard official told India Today.
At the heart of this operation lies an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) from striking at Mumbai on November 26, 2008. As many as 26 alerts warned that multiple locations, including hotels, in India's financial capital were likely targets.

But one critical alert held the possibility of preventing the outrage while the 10 attackers were still far away from Mumbai, on the high seas.
On November 19, 2008, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) flashed a one-page alert to the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. Stamped 'Top Secret, Most Immediate', it was signed by a joint director of the IB. A Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) intercept indicated a suspected LeT vessel at a precise latitude and longitude: 24 degrees 16'36" North and 67 degrees 0'04" East. "The boat was attempting to make an infiltration," the RAW's alert stated. It advised "necessary action to stop infiltration".
This was the LeT-owned fishing vessel Al-Husseini that would sail out four days later, on November 23, with its crew of 10 heavily armed terrorists.
A December 21, 2014 investigation by The New York Times, ProPublica and Frontline PBS cites classified documents leaked by NSA employee Edward Snowden to explain how British and American spy agencies had mounds of data on the LeT's preparation for the Mumbai attack but failed to connect the dots. They mentioned a November 18, 2008 CIA report to Indian counter-terror organisations on the location of a Pakistani vessel linked to a Lashkar threat against Mumbai.
This was most likely the origin of the IB's November 19 alert. Between November 19 and 23, the Coast Guard mounted Dornier air sorties and launched four patrol vessels and one hovercraft searching for this suspected LeT vessel off Gujarat. They boarded and searched 276 vessels along the west coast but evidently failed to notice the MV Kuber, an Indian trawler, which the terrorists had steered towards Mumbai to inflict mayhem. Despite repeated requests, the IB didn't give the Coast Guard further updates on the LeT vessel.
The Coast Guard action was in sharp contrast to the navy's indifference. Admiral Sureesh Mehta told a press conference on December 2, 2008, that the intelligence alerts the navy received were "not actionable". Naval intelligence officials say the position indicated on the IB alert was just 30 nautical miles off Karachi harbour and well within Pakistan's territorial waters. Crucially, the navy stamped 'NFA' or No Further Action on this alert and did not pass it on to the Mumbai-based Western Naval Command for further investigation. It was a monumental mistake because at that moment, over 30 warships of the western fleet were at sea for a 'Defence of Gujarat' exercise.
Six years later, a different story unfolded. A Coast Guard Dornier patrol aircraft took off from Porbandar airport within two hours of receiving an alert from the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) at 7.30 a.m. on December 31. The alert mentioned the 'entity' out at sea in contact with the Pakistani army and Maritime Security Agency. Four other Dornier patrol aircraft ran relay sorties out of Porbandar airport at 12 noon, 4 p.m., 7 p.m. and 10 p.m., ensuring one aircraft was always tailing the boat. A Coast Guard patrol vessel, the CGS Rajratan, closed in on the boat around 10.30 p.m. It began a frantic chase as it pursued the 20-footlong Rajratan, asking them to stop on the loud-hailer, all the while keeping a 600-metre safe distance from it. The chase ended at 3 a.m. when a fire engulfed the trawler-Coast Guard officials say the crew set fire to the boat themselves. At least two crew members are believed to have jumped overboard and drowned. Two others died in the blaze that ended when the vessel sank at 4.30 a.m. on December 2, nearly 365 km west of Porbandar.
The identity of the vessel is yet to be established. A Ministry of Defence statement on January 2 initially called it a fishing boat from Keti Bunder near Karachi that was "planning some illicit transaction in the Arabian Sea" indicating the possibility of a smuggling operation. NTRO intercepts showed the crew speaking with contacts ashore about "goods being delivered" and "payments being made into bank accounts", but no description of the cargo.
At least one other boat in the company of this mystery vessel is believed to have turned back towards Pakistan, well before the Coast Guard Dorniers arrived on the scene.
The biggest enigma in the episode remains the fire. Why would the crew choose a fiery death over surrender? Parrikar sees this as evidence for classifying them as terrorists. "A normal boat even carrying drugs can throw away the drugs and surrender. No one will kill himself unless you are motivated to do that," he said.
Coast Guard officials point at the October 1999 incident of the Japanese cargo ship MV Alondra Rainbow that was boarded by Indonesian pirates and sailed into the Arabian Sea. The pirates set fire to the ship in an attempt to scuttle it when Coast Guard ships closed in.
"The crew of this trawler were quite possibly trying to destroy incriminating evidence onboard and the fire likely went out of control," says Prabhakaran Paleri, former director-general, Coast Guard. The wreckage of the boat lies on the seabed nearly 2,000 metres beneath, preventing the recovery of any conclusive evidence.
The issue did, however, provide political parties with plenty of ammunition. Congress spokesperson Ajoy Kumar questioned the government's terror attack theory, leading BJP President Amit Shah to accuse them of "batting for Pakistan". Here, the angle the Congress completely missed, as one Coast Guard official put it, was that the entire post-26/11 coastal vigil-the inter-agency coordination, the doubling of the size of the Coast Guard-was a UPA legacy. A political brownie point they completely missed.
Follow the writer on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pakistan-lashkar-e-taiba-vessel-coast-guard-intercept-off-gujarat-coast/1/412203.html

David Headley's Danish plot and the Charlie Hebdo attack

Charlie Hebdo attack echoes David Headley's Danish plot

The attack on the newspaper offices, retaliation for its publication of Prophet Muhammad cartoons in 2005, began as an LeT plot in November 2008.

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POLITICS

 |   2-minute read |   08-01-2015

SANDEEP UNNITHAN

 @sandeepunnithan

In January 2009, US national David Coleman Headley, 49, travelled from Chicago to Copenhagen, Denmark. Among the places the Pakistani-American extensively video filmed, was the Danish capital’s most scenic square, Kongens Nytorv or Kings Square. Headley, born Daood Gilani, had more on his mind than the equestrian statues and the frozen ice skating rinks he saw there. The ISI-LeT mole paid extensive attention to the building and the area around the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten near the French embassy. Headley was no ordinary tourist. Just months before, he had meticulously filmed all the locations that were attacked by ten boat-borne Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists.

The attacks of November 26, 2008 had killed 166 persons and put the Pakistani terror group in the international spotlight. The attack on the newspaper offices, retaliation for its publication of Prophet Muhammad cartoons in 2005, began as an LeT plot in November 2008. But they wanted to delay it after feeling the heat on 26/11. This is when Osama bin Laden’s group stepped in. Al Qaeda had already signalled their hatred for the Danes with a car bomb attack. On June 2, 2008, a suicide car bomb had exploded outside the Danish embassy in Islamabad killing six persons. Now, they planned a macabre attack on the Danish newspaper itself. Terrorists would storm the building, behead newspaper employees and toss their heads out on the street for effect. But for that, Headley would have to guide them around the target.

In February 2009, Headley travelled with Abdur Rahman Pasha, a retired Pakistan army major turned terrorist, to Waziristan. Here they met the one-eyed Ilyas Kashmiri, a former Pakistan special forces officer now the al Qaeda’s number three. The trio discussed ways to carry out the Danish terror plot. Kashmiri wanted this to be a suicide attack like Mumbai 26/11. In the al Qaeda tradition, wanted the attackers to prepare martyrdom videos before they set out.

In May 2009, the trio met again. Kashmiri passed on the details of a European contact who would provide the money, weapons and attackers for the attack. In July and August that year, Headley again travelled to Copenhagen and prepared a total of 13 surveillance videos of the newspaper office. On October 3, 2009, he was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport even as he was boarding a flight to Pakistan carrying the surveillance videos to Kashmiri. The Danish terror plot was foiled and in January 23, Headley was sentenced to 35 years in prison. His deadly idea seems to have tragically inspired the attack on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo.

#David Headley, #Paris Shooting, #Charlie Hebdo

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of DailyO.in or the India Today Group. The writers are solely responsible for any claims arising out of the contents of this article.

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SANDEEP UNNITHAN@sandeepunnithan

The writer is Deputy Editor, India Today.

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Book Review/ charge of the NSG

Charge of the NSG A balanced and incisive account of 26/11 terror attacks, Black Tornado brings to focus the ill-preparedness and confusion that prevailed among the authorities By Ghazala WahabA very unexpected (certainly unintentional, on the part of the author) sentiment gripped me as I relived the horror all Indians collectively went through for nearly three days starting 26 November 2008 while reading Sandeep Unnithan’s book Black Tornado. The sentiment was awe. Not for the brave (but under-provided) men of the National Security Guards (NSG) whom the author pays a fulsome tribute through this book. Not for the much-hailed spirit of Mumbai which refuses to say die. But for the 10 enemy combatants who sailed and walked into Indian territory undetected, killed people randomly at several locations and held their own for over three days. If at any stage their faith shook, their morale quivered or their courage wavered, they did not let it come in the way of completing the task they were given. And except for two who lost direction, made mistakes with one getting himself arrested, the other eight were steadfast in their resolve. Such was their fearlessness, the level of their training and motivation that they held not just Mumbai (a place they had never been to before) but the entire India to ransom. I wrestled for a while with this insidious sentiment, debating the appropriateness of what amounts to glorifying those who brutally massacred innocent people; but the truth is when the Indian military is also coming around to talk of and prepare for irregular war, then calling these 10 men mere terrorists is indulging in convenient semantics. They were highly trained combatants, who did not lose their nerves till the end. Raising questions about their cause is again foolish, because aren’t soldiers trained never to ask questions, only to follow orders? Didn’t Alfred Tennyson write in his legendary ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade’: ‘Theirs not to make reply/ Theirs not to reason why/ Theirs but to do and die’. According to Unnithan’s research, an amphibious terrorist attack like Mumbai’s had two (both partial failures) precedents. The first one was in 1975 when eight Palestinian terrorists landed on a Tel Aviv beach. The terrorists lost their moorings upon landing and the operation failed. The second attack was also carried out by a Palestinian group in 1977. This time 11 terrorists from the Fatah group of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) landed on the Mediterranean coast of Israel and once again lost their way to the hotel they were supposed to go to and take hostages. In the random fire-fight on the street, some 50km short of Tel Aviv, 37 Israelis were killed before the terrorists were shot down by the police. Apparently, the ISI had planned a similar attack on Mumbai by gun and grenade-wielding local Muslim youth in 1993 as Phase II of the bomb blasts following the communal carnage (in the aftermath of the Babri demolition) a few months ago. The weapons for the attack had landed in Mumbai along with the RDX which was used in the blasts. But the local boys who were to carry out these attacks developed cold feet. They abandoned the weapons and the plan. This aborted attempt and the earlier Palestinian ones held both lessons and inspiration for the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba (LeT) which planned and successfully executed the November 26 attacks, with support from the ISI. Instead of relying on the locals, LeT decided to employ its own people and to overcome the limitation of unfamiliar territory, it carried out detailed reconnaissance of the targets over nearly a year, as the subsequent interrogation of David Headley revealed. Unnithan builds this background with chilling details and as said before, it brings out the meticulousness and the professionalism of planning, preparation and execution. What is the point in writing paeans to the Mumbai terrorists and invoking Tennyson, one may well ask. The point is very simple: Unnithan’s book is yet another grim reminder about how far we have come commemorating anniversaries and how little we have learnt. And most importantly, what a formidable enemy we are pitted against. As late as 5 December 2014, when Pakistani irregulars breached multiple security cordons, including the much vaulted Anti Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) to attack Indian Army’s artillery camp in Uri, all senior army officers authorised to speak with the media, which in this case were the northern army commander and the Srinagar-based 15 Corps commander, repeated the oft-repeated line: ‘there is a clear Pakistani hand behind this attack.’ Thereafter, they proceeded to give evidence to the media about the Pakistani hand: food packets, ammunition etc, which all bore Pakistani imprint. We did the same six years ago after the 26/11 attacks. And we have been doing this quite diligently after each attack. Another thing that we have been doing equally efficiently is creating obstacles after obstacles for the infiltrators/ terrorists/ irregulars to cross before attacking us. So, we are doing our best to delay him from attacking us; in the bargain we have forgotten how to deter him. This siege mentality (laying siege to our own self) has become so pervasive that the navy chief at his annual press conference on 3 December 2014 rued the fact that one cannot build a fence on the sea! For sparking this line of thinking alone, Black Tornado is an important piece of contemporary history writing. Unnithan is a polite writer. So, while his book is peppered with off-hand comments about the general lack of preparedness and the blunting of the edge that the NSG was supposed to have, he refrains from any harsh indictments, either of the Mumbai police, the marine commandoes (MARCOS) or the NSG. The let-downs on India’s part were rampant confusion, poor equipment and lack of communication. For the first few hours of the attack, despite indiscriminate firing, the administration, including the police thought it was a gang-war. Subsequently, even when the realisation dawned, nobody knew what ought to be done. The police withdrew from the scene; the army unit of 2 Grenadier, including the ghatak platoon, present in south Mumbai thought that they would be called, and kept waiting in readiness; the MARCOS who were summoned were told to rescue the hostages and not engage the terrorists, because there was no intelligence about their numbers or exact location. The refrain of the state administration was: NSG has to be called, no matter how long it took. So, effectively, everyone waited for the NSG to come while the rampage continued. And NSG took time; a lot of time to reach. While lack of communication and intelligence was the running theme during the entire operation, at Nariman House, these twin lacunae led to tragic consequences. NSG’s mandate was to rescue the hostages, just as other teams were doing at the Taj Mahal and Trident hotels. The NSG laboured over the operation, spending time over its planning and execution to ensure that they rescued as many hostages as possible. Before mounting the operation at Nariman House, they evacuated the residents from the neighbouring buildings even as another team painstakingly staked out the terrorists. Realising that there was no way to storm the building without the terrorists retaliating, they planned an insertion by the helicopter onto the roof of the building. This not only took time, but life too. NSG lost another of its men here, Havildar Gajendra Singh, Major Unnikrishnan having lost his life during the Taj Mahal operation. All this while nobody had bothered to inform the NSG that there were no hostages left to be rescued at Nariman House, despite the intercepts of the telephone conversation between the holed-up terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan! Probably for the ease of writing (and reading as well), Unnithan has divided the narration into three clean segments: the three operations. While reading about one operation in a chronological manner saves the readers the hassle of going back and forth from the scene of action, it creates the confusion about the timelines. Also, it lends insularity to all the three operations, as if each were completely independent of the other. Having said that, in Black Tornado, Unnithan’s heart is with the NSG whom he writes about with fondness and a twinge of sadness. He builds up back stories of some of the commandos who played a stellar role in breaching the three sieges of Mumbai to further humanise them, and coaxing empathy out of the readers. Having spoken to a number of survivors who lived through that carnage, Unnithan also brings out their stories with a mix of anticipation and raciness. The mindless blood-letting is disturbing, the fear of the huddled hostages palpable, but the running thought throughout the book is how unprepared we were, despite repeated intelligence inputs over a period of two years. This was compounded by the thoughtless bravado of some among our uniformed class. At one point during the NSG operation at Taj Palace hotel, GOC-in-C, army’s southern command, Lt Gen. Noble Thamburaj (who had absolutely nothing to do with the operation, given that it was being run by the NSG) arrived at the hotel lobby with his wife and personal staff. He asked to be briefed by the NSG, officer in charge of the operation at the hotel. He left the hotel giving a bombastic piece of instruction: Finish it quickly. Outside the hotel, he walked into the parked media and issued a statement claiming that the operation would be over soon. Like a truthful reporter, Unnithan dutifully records all these incidents without editorialising, leaving the readers to judge. But one wishes that in his epilogue at least he should have been a bit more hard-hitting. He rues the shortfall of equipment and inadequacies of equipment, but ignores the complete absence of policy-making, which is the key to India’s vulnerability to repeated terrorist violence. But perhaps, he just wanted to keep his focus on the courage of the NSG. Sadly, in India we continue to rely solely on the courage of young men and officers, in the absence of policies, training and end-state. BLACK TORNADO 26/11: The Three Sieges of Mumbai Sandeep Unnithan Harper Collins, Pg 216, Rs 299