Tuesday, 13 October 2015

Why Syria is the new Afghanistan

Why Syria is the new Afghanistan and Turkey is the new Pakistan

History repeats itself as Russia enters another complicated battleground.

 |  5-minute read |   12-10-2015
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The Russian ground technicians in khaki shorts and summer hats could have been straight out of Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase in the 1980s as they refueled and rearmed fighter jets. But the pictures were recently taken in the Syrian air force base of Latakia and released by Russia as the bear flexed its muscles on the Mediterranean Sea. Since September 30, Russia has launched an aerial bombing campaign pounding opponents of President Bashar al-Assad. Russian ground-attack jets, Su-25 "Frogfoots" and the Su-24 "Fencers" identical to the ones that the Soviet Union used to bomb and strafe CIA-supported Mujahideen during its nine-year-long military occupation of Afghanistan. Further evidence of deja vu came from US statements that Russia was bombing "CIA-trained fighters", as opposed, presumably, to the vicious Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). "That’s why the Russian position is doomed to fail," US defence secretary Ashton Carter said in Washington on September 30.
The Soviet Union’s eight-year-long military campaign in Afghanistan, a historically implacable battle ground 3,700km east of Syria, was the world’s last superpower proxy war. It was also one of the factors which accelerated the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union.
The Syrian campaign, in another historical crossroad, is the first deployment of President Vladimir Putin’s resurgent Russian military machine (not counting the brief five-day incursion into south Ossetia in August 2008). The intervention has taken attention away from Russia’s precarious economic position — its energy export dependent economy contracted by 3.5 per cent this year after oil prices crashed to $50 dollars a barrel last year — and boosted President Putin’s approval ratings.
Hundreds of Russian special forces, tanks and fighter aircraft have created a ring of steel around territories held by President al Assad’s forces and allowed the Syrian army to go on the offensives against rebel forces. . A four-year-long civil war saw rebel groups like the al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS bite away vast swathes government-held territory, leaving Assad in control of less than a third of his country, mostly the Alawite-dominated coastal areas.
Even a month ago, Assad’s survival was in question, having lost 15 per cent more territory and an army unable to mount ground offensives against Syrian rebels. Putin blunderbuss against anti-Assad rebels — the newest, a barrage of 26 cruise missiles against rebel targets fired from warships moored in the Caspian Sea more than 1,500km away — have now given his Syrian ally a breather.
Reports suggest the Russian intervention was at Iran’s behest — General Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Republican Guards’ Al Quds Force, is believed to have visited Moscow in July and sought assistance to bolster Assad’s tottering forces. Iran knows how precarious the military situation in Syria is. It has propped up the Assad regime since 2011 at great cost, losing three Brigadier-General ranked officers on the Syrian battlefront. The loss of senior Iranian officers — one each to strikes by the Al Nusra Front, Israel and ISIS — illustrates the bewildering complexity of Syria’s war. The country is now a witches’ brew of foreign fighters and a multinational bombing range. Fighter aircraft from four of the five P5 countries are now in the air over the shattered country. Russia and the US are now trying to ensure their bombers don’t clash in Syrian airspace just as Soviet and Pakistani fighter aircraft did, shooting each other down, during Afghanistan’s equally complex nine-year-long insurgency.  
The Mujahideen, as the disparate coalition of guerillas strung across the Afghan countryside were called, were armed, trained and equipped by a grouping of western nations, primarily the US and the UK, fronted by the CIA which pumped in cash and arms through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); China whose ordnance factories churned out the assault rifles and artillery pieces used by the Mujahideen and Saudi Arabia which also funded the guerillas, contributed thousands of "Arab legion" fighters including the son of a billionaire Saudi Arabian construction magnate, Osama bin Laden. Pakistan bore the immediate brunt of the Afghan War: Three million Afghan refugees and the corrosive flow of drugs and weapons from the Golden Crescent.
Thirteen years after the Soviet pullout, the dregs of the Afghan war hit the United States. Al Qaeda terrorists, trained in camps that once housed the Mujahideen, plunged three hijacked airliners into the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon, heralding the beginning of the first wave of Islamist terror. The "War on Terror", a US coinage, found distant echoes with terror attacks in Bali and Madrid A war which, in 2003, inexplicably lurched in an unexpected direction: the invasion of Iraq. The US-led invasion destroyed Iraq as a cohesive entity, cracked open its centuries-old ethnic divide and spawned the even more vicious ISIS. The new group, built by Sunni Arabs and Saddam's former Baathists, quickly shook off their al Qaeda mentors to launch the second phase of the Islamist terrorism, one where the insurgent group captured and administered territory as large as the United Kingdom.
ISIS was emboldened by the withdrawals of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, wars which a 2013 calculation by Harvard University’s Kennedy School of government reckoned, cost the US more than $6 trillion dollars. The US which lost more than 6,600 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, was unlikely to commit "boots on the ground" into Syria. Neither will Russia for that matter. President Vladimir Putin said in a October 11 interview to a TV channel there was 'no question' of committing ground troops to Syria. Russia, he said, was committed to a political solution
The Syrian war, one of three still-raging Arab Spring conflicts now into their fifth year, has meanwhile spilled into Turkey with which shares a 400km border and onto Europe. As of February this year, the UN declared Turkey to be the world’s largest refugee hosting country has spent $6 billion to host 2.1 million Syrian refugees.
On October 10, twin suicide bomb blasts in Ankara killed 128 persons, the deadliest attacks on Turkish soil. The attacks, believed to masterminded by ISIS, have brought the focus back to the murderous Islamic State.
This July, the US army’s outgoing chief General Ray Odierno said that the fight against ISIS would last decades, a stunning expansion of older timelines suggested by the Obama administration. "In my mind, ISIS is a ten to twenty year problem. It’s not a two year problem," General Odierno said in Washington. That was before Russia’s military surge into Syria. The dramatic Russian entry could possibly shorten the war but as with Syria’s distant echo, Afghanistan, the blowback on the rest of the world cannot be predicted. 

Friday, 2 October 2015

Why the Navy needs fewer INS Kochis

Why Indian Navy needs fewer INS Kochis

It needs larger numbers of patrol vessels and light frigates, not expensive destroyers.

 |  3-minute read |   01-10-2015
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The guided missile destroyer INS Kochi that joined the Indian Navy in Mumbai on September 30 is a fearsome combatant. This 7400-tonne warship bristles with supersonic cruise missiles, two multi-role helicopters, long range anti-aircraft missiles, guns and torpedoes. This is the reason every Admiral would want to have several such powerful floating arsenals in his fleet. The Indian Navy sees itself fielding a force of 150 warships by 2027. A bulk of these warships will be frigates and destroyers like the INS Kochi capable of neutralising enemy aircrafts, warships, submarines and attacking targets on land and escorting merchant vessels transiting near enemy waters. However, the last major naval conflict was over three decades ago, in the Falklands.
Peacetime mission for the Indian naval fleet includes overseas diplomatic flag-flying missions: in the past year, the Navy has sent its warships to 40 countries across the globe; has been patrolling the Indian coastline to prevent 26/11-type terror attacks, providing humanitarian assistance missions like the rescue of over 4,000 Indian nationals stranded in Yemen and, since 2008, the deployment of one warship in the Gulf of Aden to counter Somali pirates.
There are time and cost constraints in achieving a fleet size the Navy wants. Each Kolkata/Kochi class destroyer costs over Rs 4,000 crore to build. The Navy can afford only a limited number of such warships. Expensive combat platforms will always be subject to the vagaries of budget cuts. This year, the NDA downsized the IAF’s (Indian AirForce) ginormous $20 billion proposal to buy 126 twin-engined Rafale fighter jets, to a modest buy of just 36 aircrafts for $4 billion. There is another instructive lesson in the IAF’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender that the Rafale won. The MMRCA project began in 1999 as a modest buy of 126 single-engined Mirage 2000 aircrafts.
The Navy currently has five Project 15 "city class" destroyers which it has been inducting rather slowly since 1997. Current plans call for adding ten more such expensive destroyers, costing upwards of $1 billion, by 2027 or at an ambitious rate of one warship a year.
It is unlikely the Mumbai-based public sector shipyard Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) can handle this rate of construction. The MDL takes upwards of five years to build a destroyer like the INS Kochi because of inadequate investment in modern ship construction technology. That’s not good news for the Navy which is struggling to replace its ageing warships.
There is a far more cost-effective option within the Navy: the Naval Offshore Patrol Vessel (NOPV) or the INS Saryu class of vessels, four of which are in service. These 2,300-tonne warships are armed with 76 mm main guns, two 30 mm cannons, a helicopter and carry marine commandos. Its economical diesel engines boast of an impressive range of 6,000 nautical miles. Compared to the city class destroyers, the NOPVs are dirt cheap. For the price of one Kochi destroyer, the Navy can buy nine NOPVs. It takes just 36 months to build one such vessel which can perform all the Navy’s peacetime constabulary and flag-showing roles. They can also be used for escort duties in wartime by adding modular plug and play weapon packages — containerised missiles and towed array sonars — which can dramatically increase their combat profile. NOPVs will allow the Navy to field dozens of such inexpensive warships in quantities which will give them a quality of their own.
The trouble is, the Navy is not buying enough NOPVs. It plans to field only nine vessels as opposed to over 20 pricey frigates and destroyers.
This is possibly because, as Robert Kaplan notes in his book Monsoon, the Indian Navy, like the Chinese Navy, is preparing to fight titanic doomsday sea battles which are increasingly unlikely to happen.

Friday, 21 August 2015

Modi to walk OROP talk

Modi to walk OROP talk

After a nasty impasse between the defence and finance minist ry and the ugly spectacle of veterans on hunger strike, the One Rank, One Pension issue is now back in the PM's court

IndiaToday.in   |   August 20, 2015 | UPDATED 12:21 IST

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Narendra Modi meets commanders at the Annual Combined Commanders Conference of the Armed Forces in Delhi.Narendra Modi meets commanders at the Annual Combined Commanders Conference of the Armed Forces in Delhi.
General Dalbir Singh is to embark on his toughest challenge since taking over as army chief last July. Beginning August 25, sources say, the Army chief will mediate in a contentious battle between the government and ex-servicemen on the implementation of One Rank, One Pension (OROP).
The unprecedented step of involving the army chief was precipitated by a series of events over the past few months: an unresolved deadlock between the defence and finance ministries, the impact of simmering street protests on serving armed forces personnel and the failure of talks between the government and ex-servicemen. The OROP issue is now being handled directly by the PMO which will attempt to resolve the issue. On August 18, General Dalbir Singh first intervened to facilitate a meeting between the PM's Principal Secretary Nripendra Misra and ex-servicemen.
The hour-long meeting, the veterans' first interaction with the government since the start of their June 15 relay hunger strike, ended inconclusively. Misra wanted the protesting military veterans to "restore normalcy", wind down their nationwide campaign-particularly a fast-unto-death begun by three ex-servicemen at Jantar Mantar on August 17. The veterans wanted a deadline for implementation. Misra could give them none.

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Prime Minister Modi, sources told India Today, was keen to firewall the service chiefs from the two-month-long protest by the veterans at Jantar Mantar. Now, he had little option but to recognise the umbilical ties between serving and retired soldiers. General Dalbir Singh will be represented by senior serving army officers in the talks with the veterans. "Only a serving army chief can command the respect of the ex-servicemen," a veteran says. The build-up had been gradual. On August 13, four former armed forces chiefs wrote to President Pranab Mukherjee warning him that the stand-off had the potential to inflict long-term damage on India's apolitical military ethos and the self-esteem of its serving soldiers.
The Delhi Police's inept attempt to evict the protesting veterans from Jantar Mantar on August 14 pumped fresh oxygen into the struggle. Visuals of veterans being roughed up by police triggered outrage across the country and prompted an angst-ridden open letter signed by seven former army chiefs, two former air force chiefs and a navy chief to the PM. The August 17 letter condemned the police action and warned of serious blowback from the OROP imbroglio to the services.
It was the worst indictment of the government by former chiefs. No issue has in recent years prompted 14 former service chiefs to write to the government, another sign of how the NDA completely misread the campaign. Worse, by repeatedly promising to deliver on an issue deflected by earlier governments and then seeming to backtrack on his commitment, Prime Minister Modi exposed himself to ridicule. "He promised a Rs 1.25-lakh crore package for Bihar but he does not have Rs 8,000 crore for OROP for ex-servicemen, who for the first time are sitting on protest," Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi said in Amethi on August 18.
The PMO was already in firefighting mode three days before the PM's Independence Day speech, where he once again reiterated his government's commitment to OROP as "a long-pending issue, whose discussions were underway and in the last stages". On August 12, PMO officials contacted former army chief General Ved Prakash Malik to mediate with the ex-servicemen. General Malik then roped in a passionate OROP votary, Rajya Sabha Member of Parliament Rajeev Chandrasekhar. The negotiations which took place in Chandrasekhar's North Avenue office involved General Malik, a joint secretary from the PMO and veterans' groups. But just two days later, by August 14, the former chief realised that both sides were unwilling to compromise. Talks broke down completely.
With the PMO now once again set to resume talks with the veterans beginning August 25, it will have to negotiate the same minefield which the parleys with General Malik and Misra walked over-to get ex-servicemen to agree to reduce their demands.
If the government agrees to OROP from 2015 onwards, it will need to pay Rs 8,293 crore per year plus an equal sum in arrears for 2014. In negotiations with the veterans it revealed a willingness to pay Rs 4,000 crore and hike existing pensions by 50 per cent. The government wants to make 2011, not 2014, as the year for a cut-off date for revised pensions, far short of the OROP that the veterans want.
Anything less than One Rank, One Pension will only mean enhancing the existing pensions," says Major General Satbir Singh, chairman of the Indian Ex Servicemen Movement (IESM), who lists three key demands: (a) The definition of OROP is sacrosanct and will not be tampered with-equal pensions for similar ranks and same length of service, regardless of the last drawn pay; (b) OROP will be effective from April 1, 2014, as per the UPA's February 2014 decision; (c) and that the NDA should announce a date of implementation. These will prove to be hard decisions for the government to take especially on an issue that seemed a done deal when Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar calculated last December that the government's Rs 1.25 lakh crore annual pension bill would marginally increase when it paid Rs 8,293 crore to the ex-servicemen. The Arun Jaitley-led finance ministry stubbornly opposed this. "It (OROP) will impose a huge financial burden on us and open the floodgates for similar such claims from the paramilitary forces," a senior finance ministry official told india today.
Irrespective of its outcome, the acrimony over OROP has upset the delicate civil-military balance. "There are some people who feel that the neglect of the military has tended to become contempt for the military," says General Malik. Clearly the hidden costs of this imbroglio will be more than just financial.
- Follow the writer on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan

Saturday, 8 August 2015

What the captured terrorist can do for India


What the caught terrorist can do for India

The NIA will construct a foolproof case for India based on the testimony of Naved Mohammed, captured alive in the Udhampur attack.

 |  3-minute read |   08-08-2015
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Naved Mohammed, captured at Udhampur on August 5 is not the first Pakistani terrorist to be caught alive. Since the sensational capture of the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist Ajmal Kasab during the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, dozens of such foreign militants have been captured in Jammu and Kashmir. The Daily Excelsior newspaper reported on August 5 that 51 foreign militants are still lodged in the state’s jails. Two high profile recent cases in the tenure of the NDA government include Lashkar-e-Toiba militant Mohammed Naved Jutt, a resident of Multan, Punjab Province, captured in south Kashmir in June 2014 and Siddiqui, a Jaish-e-Mohammed Divisional Commander originally from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, in October 2014. Both sang like canaries about the role of the Pakistan army and ISI in running training camps.
Jutt, who trained with the 2008 Mumbai attacker Ajmal Kasab at the LeT’s Maskar Aksa camp in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) told J&K police about the LeT’s annoyance that their Mumbai assassins had left vital clues—a floating boat, a GPS handset and a live and chatty Ajmal Kasab.
Astonishingly, unlike Ajmal Kasab’s sensational revelations, none of these attackers ever got the media spotlight that Naved Mohammed did. Both cases were investigated by the state police and the ‘enemy combatants’ Jutt and Siddiqui, arrested under the J&K Public Safety Act. Over a hundred ‘Foreign Terrorists’ captured alive by Indian security forces since the dawn of militancy have since been released and gone back home to Pakistan. Three, including the notorious Maulana Masood Azhar, were released in exchange for the IC-814 passengers taken hostage in December 1999.
The investigations by state police are usually confined to a single incident. The banality of the arrests and investigations fails to capture the strategic dimensions of a cross-border war being waged against India. The arrests by the state police has also failed to highlight a tectonic shift in this war over the past decade. The foot soldiers for this long war come, not from Jammu and Kashmir, but like Faisalabad resident Naveed Mohammed, from the provinces of Pakistan. They are inducted and trained in camps run by the Pakistan army’s ISI before they are launched across the border.
The armed response to such terror attacks must be left to local police units who are first responders. Investigations, however, must be given to central agencies who will be able to establish the broader international dimensions of the conspiracy.
This is the context to see the home ministry’s August 6 decision to hand over Naved Mohammed’s case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The NIA, set up as a specialized terrorism investigation agency after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has transformed the terror investigation paradigm. It has eschewed old-fashioned police methods of torturing suspects to extract confessions in favour of sustained interrogations and investigations.
And, unlike the extracted confessions, which swiftly collapse in courts, none of the NIA’s chargesheets have so far been undermined.
You only have to read a list of over 100 superbly documented cases on the official website - from that of international gunrunner Anthony Shimray to the methodical investigation which unraveled the 2011 Delhi High Court blast - to know why they are different.
The agency has the ability to gather credible evidence to build up watertight cases which will stand the scrutiny of international law. It will doubtless, do the same in the case of Naved Mohammed.

Friday, 7 August 2015

Turning the tide against terrorism

How India is turning the tide against terrorism

Both Gurdaspur and Udhampur are exactly what anti-terror experts have said for decades: the first responders, the local police units, must react.

 |  2-minute read |   07-08-2015
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Nothing would delight the Pakistan Army and the ISI more than to see the Indian Army fighting terrorism. After all, one of the reasons General Head Quarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi has deployed its strategic weapon — terrorists — across its eastern borders is to tie a numerically superior Indian army down in a long drawn and costly counter-insurgency campaign within its borders. No one knew this better than the Pakistan Army and the ISI then when they played a part in bleeding the Soviet bear in the Afghan insurgency between 1980 and 1988. No one knows this better than the Pakistan Army now — 24 of its 67 brigades, over 30,000 soldiers, have been deployed fighting militants in North Waziristan for the past 14 months.
Yet, two outrageous incidents in the past week tell us the tide against state-sponsored terrorism could be turning. On July 27, it was the Punjab police that tackled the three Fidayeen terrorists who struck at the police station in Gurdaspur. The sight of pot-bellied Punjab policemen wielding elderly self-loading rifles may not have made great TV visuals, but no one can question the fighting spirit of a force that last saw terrorists over two decades ago. The police made short work of the Gurdaspur siege killing the three terrorists. On the National Highway-4 near Udhampur on August 5, it was the Border Security Force (BSF) that fought back. A lone constable shot back and killed one of the two terrorists that fired at the passenger bus. The constable, known only by his first name, Rocky, averted what could have been a massacre of a busload of over 40 unarmed BSF personnel. A second terrorist, Mohammad Naveed believed to be a resident of Faislabad, Pakistan, fled the ambush. Captured by Jammu and Kashmir police and village defence committee members, just as Ajmal Kasab was in Mumbai, in 2008, Naveed is the newest face of an unending policy of cross-border terrorism.
Both Gurdaspur and Udhampur are exactly what anti-terrorism manuals and experts have said for decades: the first responders, the local police units, must react. Special units must come in only in the case of unusual situations like massive Mumbai 26/11-type sieges involving multiple civilians. India's strategic competitors will be quick to point out the dichotomy of a country that aspires for a seat at the UN Security Council deploying its army to tackle internal police duties.
If the police and paramilitary have now begun to tackle terrorism, without army assistance, it is commendable. These are successes state and central governments must build upon by implementing long-delayed police reforms to allow the force to become more professional. The army is a weapon of last resort. It should be remain as one.

Clearing the OROP logjam

Clearing the OROP logjam

As the defence and finance ministries are locked in a battle over the Rs 8,293 crore policy, the government struggles to deliver on its promise to ex-servicemen

Sandeep Unnithan   |    |   August 6, 2015 | UPDATED 21:36 IST

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Ex-servicemen protest at Jantar Mantar, Delhi, against the delay in the implementation of the OROP policy
For more than a month now, Jantar Mantar, in the heart of central Delhi, is the theatre of a very different battle. Black armband wearing ex-servicemen in regimental accouterments, moustaches quivering with rage and voices screaming betrayal, are on a relay hunger strike demanding One Rank, One Pension (OROP) or, equal pensions for similar ranks and same length of service, regardless of the last drawn pay. Posters on the stage list three places like they would do for military campaigns - Rewari in Haryana, Siachen and the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya-locations where Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised to grant OROP over the past year.
The government says it is already committed to implement OROP. It was first announced by President Pranab Mukherjee in his speech on June 9 last year and then by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley in his February 28 budget speech where he set aside Rs 1,000 crore. The delay in implementation is beguiling. The government says it is still "working out the modalities". Ex-servicemen smell perfidy. The government, they suspect, wants to dilute the very definition of OROP. Hence, the street protests at Jantar Mantar.
"We are fighting for the most needy sections of society, over 6.45 lakh widows of soldiers," says Major General Satbir Singh, chairman of the Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM) which has led the demand for OROP since 2008. "Today, a soldier's widow gets a pension of just Rs 3,500. How can she raise her children with this paltry sum?"

Manohar Parrikar (left) and Arun Jaitley

The OROP issue has triggered a different war between North and South Blocks just a kilometre away from Jantar Mantar. Late last year, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said it would cost the government Rs 8,293 crore to implement its promise of OROP. The move will benefit an estimated 2 million ex-servicemen and 6.45 lakh surviving spouses of military personnel. This spike in the government's annual pension bill has led to differences with the finance ministry which has reportedly turned down the Ministry of Defence's OROP formula. One story has it that a heated meeting between the defence and finance ministers ended with Parrikar threatening to quit if OROP was not speedily cleared. The finance ministry is believed to have tossed the OROP ball into the court of the Seventh Central Pay Commission which will present its report to the government this October.
The veterans, meanwhile, have planned to step up their nationwide agitation which entered its 42nd day on July 26, the 16th anniversary of the Kargil war. A group of 25 ex-servicemen have petitioned the IESM to go on an indefinite fast after August 15. This is because speculation is rife that the OROP will finally be announced by Narendra Modi from the ramparts of the Red Fort on August 15. "If the PM can hand out a Rs 6,500-crore line of credit to Mongolia, what is a few thousand crores for our men in uniform?" asks Congress leader Sachin Pilot, who calls the delay unbecoming of the government.
The NDA swept to power partly on three promises made to ex-servicemen: the setting up of a war memorial in the heart of Lutyens' Delhi, appointing a veteran's commission and granting One Rank, One Pension. The government is yet to move on the first two and yet to implement the third.
Nowhere does it risk a serious loss to its credibility as it does with the delay over OROP.
<a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/people/rahul-gandhi-profile-autobiography/17735.html"><img class="pf_img" src="http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories/rahulgandhi_042215034844.jpg" width="30" height="30" alt=""/>Rahul Gandhi</a>

Rahul Gandhi

Narendra Modi is not the first Indian prime minister to worry about the problems of ex-servicemen and pensions. In 1982, PM Indira Gandhi set up a high-level committee to inquire into the problems of ex-servicemen, the government's first-ever such body. It had been prompted by her return as PM in 1980 when she had also held the defence portfolio for two years and when complaints poured in from retired soldiers. In March 1984, she appointed Minister of State for Defence K.P. Singh Deo to head a committee which included several central ministers- Vayalar Ravi, Janardhana Poojary and P.A. Sangma. The committee met ex-servicemen across the country and discovered that one of the root causes of their unhappiness lay in defence pensions. Prior to the Third Pay Commission of 1973, the armed forces paid all its retired personnel 75 per cent of their last basic pay. Soldiers, who made up 85 per cent of the Army, were not paid a pension as they served only for five years.
A changed pay structure
This changed with the implementation of the Third Pay Commission in 1973. The Pay Commission, which decided pay and salaries for all central government employees, brought the armed forces into its ambit and equated them with civilian personnel. In one fell swoop, officers and men now began to receive only 50 per cent of their last pay. Civilian pension was enhanced from 33 per cent to 50 per cent. The government also increased the tenure of its soldiers from five to 15 years. This meant that a soldier would now be over 35 when he retired.
A second anomaly crept in 1979 when Finance Minister H.N. Bahuguna hiked the pay of serving soldiers by merging a portion of the basic pay to the dearness allowance. This effectively increased their pensions, calculated at 50 per cent of the last pay drawn for 10 months. Thus, the first disparity between pensioners who had retired before and after 1979 crept in.
On October 27, 1984, Singh Deo's committee presented its 160-page report with a list of 69 recommendations to Indira Gandhi. India Today accessed this report that first used the word OROP and recommended that the government grant it. Defence pensions were not part of the terms of reference of the committee. The committee decided to include it because pension-related problems were given top priority in representations from ex-servicemen's organisations as also individuals of all the three services.
The committee cited the precedent adopted by the government for handing out pensions for judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court. The government implemented 66 of the 69 recommendations of the committee. It put three crucial suggestions on the backburner-a separate commission for ex-servicemen, an ex-servicemen finance corporation, and, OROP. It was the first time that the government had signaled its reluctance on OROP; it would not be the last.
The issue of OROP periodically resurfaced in the Fourth and Fifth Pay Commissions but was never implemented. The Ministry of Defence preferred to narrow the gap between past and present pensioners by making one-time payments to 'modify parity', like the committee headed by then defence minister Sharad Pawar did in 1991.
OROP remained forgotten until the Sixth Pay Commission presented its recommendations in 2008. The Pay Commission widened the disparity between military personnel who had retired before and after January 1, 2006-the date from which it would take effect. The implications of the Sixth Pay Commission were that a soldier with 17 years of service retiring before 2006 would get Rs 7,605 less than a soldier retiring in 2014.
A Major General with 33 years of service who retired in 2006 would get Rs 30,000 less than his counterpart who retired in 2014.
This huge disparity instantly sparked demands by ex-servicemen's movements for equal pension. The OROP fire was lit. The UPA turned down OROP for administrative, legal and financial reasons. To pass on the benefits to previous pensioners would be a gigantic administrative task because records of pensioners prior to the 1980s were held in handwritten registers. The law ministry had warned against implementing OROP and held out a Supreme Court judgement which upheld the government's right to announce a cut-off date for any emolument. Besides, said the bureaucrats, other government services like the paramilitary forces too would ask for OROP. A 2011 report of a committee headed by BJP MP Bhagat Singh Koshyari recommended OROP. The committee also precisely defined what it meant by OROP-equal pay for the same rank in the same length of service irrespective of date of retirement. This committee report too went into cold storage. The UPA relented only when the 2014 general elections were upon it. In February 2014, it released Rs 500 crore for OROP in its interim budget. In April 2014, a draft government letter signed by Defence Minister A.K. Antony listed out the revised pay scales for pensioners (see chart). OROP provided huge benefits to the lower ranks. A pension parity would double pensions given to soldiers, fr­om Rs 4,000 to more than Rs 8,000. It would also benefit pensioners who had retired at the lower ranks, parti­cularly Majors who would see their Rs 14,000 monthly pensions double. (These are yet to be implemented).
The UPA's sudden U-turn on OROP was forced by the NDA's PM candidate Narendra Modi who announced OROP at an ex-servicemen's rally in Rewari, Haryana in September 2013. But as the current impasse shows, it now seems that the Modi government is having a rethink and may even be reluctant to implement its proposals in full. The Seventh Pay Commission is set to be implemented beginning January next year. If OROP is not implemented soon, veterans fear the Seventh Pay Commission will only widen the disparity between pensioners. The issue, as Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Member of Parliament in the Rajya Sabha says, is more than just pensions. "At a time when countries such as Britain are entering into legal covenants between government, citizens and their armed forces-enshrining in law the country's obligations for the sacrifices and service of armed forces-it's important that we do the same and most importantly not to break OROP commitments made to our veterans and serving men and women."
The death of lateral induction
Successive governments since those of Indira Gandhi have worried over a phenomena. Each year, nearly 60,000 trained Army soldiers retire and become civilians. This is among the largest drain of trained manpower in the world. The 1.5 million-strong armed forces, the world's fourth largest, retires its soldiers at the age of 34 to ensure they retain their youthful profile. Most draw military pensions that ranges between 35 and 50 per cent of the last pay drawn.

Both the UPA and the NDA promised to implement OROP. But it was Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seen here at an ex-servicemen's rally in Rewari, Haryana, in September 2013, who made it an article of faith for his government.

The Sixth Pay Commission was the first to suggest a way out of the pension trap. The Commission presented its report in 2008, in the midst of a surge in central paramilitary force numbers to counter left wing extremism. It devoted a full chapter to the issue of lateral induction to what it saw was the clearest solution yet to providing trained manpower for central paramilitary forces and providing sufficiently long tenure for defence forces personnel. It even suggested abolition of the armed forces pay group structure so that a lateral shift would not lead to a loss of pay. But this was not to be.
While implementing the report in 2008, the government promised to "examine the issue at a later date". After five years, in 2013, the home ministry finally wrote to the Central Pay Commission that the proposal was "not acceptable at this point". The proposal for laterally inducting personnel to save paying them pensions, was thus quietly buried.
OROP is affordable
An Indian Army presentation to the Seventh Pay Commission earlier this year attacked the very basis of the government's opposition to OROP: that pensions are simply unaffordable.
The MoD's opposition to OROP came through in its 2011 deposition by the Secretary (Expenditure) before the Koshyari Committee estimated it would cost Rs 1,065 crore to implement OROP. This figure would increase by 10 per cent each year, finally touching Rs 2,379 crore by 2016-17, when the Seventh Pay Commission would add a 25 per cent increase in pensions. This calculation, as Parrikar's newest OROP estimate of Rs 8293 crore now shows, underestimated the payout.
The Army presentation prepared by its Pay Commission Cell, excerpts of which were accessed by india today, says this is far from the truth. The Army has linked defence pensions with the growth of the GDP to show that they are actually shrinking as a percentage of the defence pension budget with regards to GDP. The Army says the present pension bill of Rs 54,500 crore also includes those for 4 lakh defence civilians. "There is no doubt the (pension) figures would rise in absolute numbers. However, when viewed as a percentage of the nation's GDP, the expenditure on defence pensions shows an overall declining trend-from 0.54 per cent of the GDP in 1999-2000 to 0.38 per cent in 2014-15," the Army presentation says.
The ex-servicemen have pointed at the bureaucracy as being the stumbling block to OROP. "It is the bureaucracy that is denying us our rightful dues. Before he took charge of his bureaucrats, (Parrikar) was fed figures ranging from Rs 1,300 crore to Rs 22,000 crore to create a scare of a financial shortage," says Major General Satbir Singh. But the bureaucrats deny this. "Left to itself the bureaucracy would not like to implement OROP because of various reasons such as other services asking for it. But once the political leadership commits to it, then all other reasons cease to matter," a senior defence ministry bureaucrat says.
The ex-servicemen, have meanwhile, intensified their agitation with calls to boycott the government's commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the 1965 India-Pakistan war this month and, an indefinite hunger strike after August 15.
The political will to implement OROP seems to have vanished and this is what is worrying retired service chiefs.
At least two former service chiefs, Admiral Arun Prakash and General Ved Prakash Malik, recently warned of the impact of the OROP on the morale of serving soldiers. General Malik, Army chief during the 1999 Kargil War, said: "The government must take a decision soon. The agitation is going on in different cities. Sooner or later, it will impact serving soldiers." That could be the real worry.
 
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