BJP is no longer fit to govern India, says Jaswant Singh

Archive

Elections

Highlights

April 7, 2014

Sandeep Unnithan  March 28, 2014 | UPDATED 20:03 IST

Jaswant Singh with wife Sheetal Kumari

Jaswant Singh, 76, sits on an ornate wooden chair in a room surrounded by vintage sepia prints of shikars and colonial battles. His younger son Bhupinder's 32-room sandstone Hotel Rawal Kot in Jaisalmer is his temporary war room in his campaign through Barmer, India's largest Lok Sabha constituency. The hotel is just 100 km away from Pokhran, Ground Zero of India's 1998 nuclear tests. As the NDA's foreign minister, Singh steered India out of the global isolation after the nuclear tests. Today, the veteran leader stands isolated within a party he has been with since its inception, deserted by key leaders after he unfurled a banner of revolt on March 21 when he filed his papers as an Independent from Barmer. The immediate reason for Singh parting ways with BJP was his party's decision to hand the ticket to Colonel Sona Ram Chaudhary, a Congress defector. In 2009, Singh was thrown out of BJP for commenting on Sardar Patel's role in the partition of India in his book. He says he has revolted now because of the authoritarianism and sycophancy that have crept into the party. His gait is a measured shuffle, his hands tremble as he drinks tea, but the distinctive gravelly voice, that starts somewhere in his belly, announces he has lost none of his taste for battle. In 2010, he rejoined BJP at the insistence of then president Nitin Gadkari. This time, he tells Deputy Editor Sandeep Unnithan, there is no going back.
Q. Is BJP, a party you have been associated with for over 34 years, changing now?
A. The party has become authoritarian slowly in the last two or three years. BJP used to be democratic, consultative; it revolved around a political thought, ideology, around a political organisation. I think post-Mr Vajpayee and Advani, the space for discussion, disagreement and different viewpoints has died. The (NDA) Cabinet was really democratic because I have personally held very serious discussions and had disagreements with Vajpayee as PM.
Q. What were these disagreements?
A. On policy matters. It was always a discussion, a give and take. Now, every discussion is abruptly ended as not beneficial to the party.

Q. What about the NaMo chants you objected to?
A. 'Namo Namo' has a religious connotation to it. How can you reduce leadership to the veneration of individuals? Gandhi held no political office and yet he negotiated the partition of this country and that is a reality. My book on Jinnah examined one of the most important, cataclysmic events of the 20th century. The resolution for that was moved by the Congress party. Pandit Nehru's move was seconded by Sardar Patel and Gandhi was present. A number of people like Jayaprakash Narayan and Ram Manohar Lohia opposed this decision.
Why do I cite this particular example? Such a poignant event, the partition of my country… a motion is moved by Nehru and Patel... it is opposed... it is put to vote and it is lost upon which Gandhi intervenes to allow the motion to pass. This is an example of what democratic functioning used to be.
Q. Are you saying intolerance in the BJP began in 2009?
A. It began earlier. The declaration of that fraudulent Emergency destroyed so many institutions and squashed our democratic spirit and (D.K.) Barooah could say that 'India is Indira and Indira is India'. So this is an early example of the sycophancy that was infecting India. I think the 'NaMo NaMo' ritual is an example of the same tendency. The Emergency sapped India's essence and set us on a course of falsehood.
Q. Is there an internal emergency within BJP?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. Rajnath Singh replaced 'BJP' with 'Modi' in a tweet.
A. Those are of course the absurdities of conduct. I don't want to comment on a personality but... I don't want to say it...I will say something really harsh which I don't want to.
Q. Has the BJP president tried to contact you?
A. (Laughs) He hasn't. It's a matter of some wonderment as to why he has chosen to use the office of the president to expel me twice within five years. I don't want to cite how much I helped him when he first came to the Centre...that's all right...I don't think gratitude is a particularly recognizable feature in BJP or in any political party.
The party asked me to contest the office of the Vice-President saying you are not a winnable candidate...that's the reason given by the chief minister... she's not Rajasthani, her nature is not Rajasthani... she does not know the language of this land, the ethos, the culture. My wife went to a police station to file a complaint (against a calendar depicting Vasundhara Raje as a goddess) but the police wouldn't file an FIR.
My book is banned in Gujarat, I'm expelled from BJP and the same fellow who is now the party president tells me on the telephone "you are expelled from the party". Then he goes and gives a public speech, if you say one word in favour of Jinnah (breaks away)... Jinnah divided our country along with Nehru and Patel!
If they had simply not agreed to it, we would not have got divided. That is a reality.
Q. Are you saying that there is an alternative mythology being built around Patel?
A. Exactly. Why do you want to build an alternative mythology? The reality is so different. Just like Pakistan. Pakistan has had to build a total falsity. We are now some kind of second-rate Pakistan in wanting to build a completely mythological history. For what?
Q. Who made the offer for you to contest for Vice-President?
A. BJP's central leadership. I don't like to say these things, I was also recognised as the best parliamentarian. The country had better wake up and recognise the dangers that come from within. The BJP president proudly announces about a certain party member, "Main inke peechey chattan ki tarah khada hoon". What rubbish is this? When you begin to venerate an individual, you are putting aside the people which is the essence of democracy. Dissent is part of democracy.
Q. How does BJP appear to you in its present form?
A. I feel the communists, the CPI(M), are more democratic now than the BJP. It's ironic.
Q. Your opponents would say that all would be well if you had got the Barmer seat.
A. No. I would still have held my views. Why did I ask to contest from Barmer? I asked Bhairon Singh Shekhawat in 1989 to let me contest from Barmer. "No, you have to contest from Jodhpur." Then Chittor... In this fashion I was kept out of Barmer. Then I was asked to go to Darjeeling. The Gorkha Janmukti Morcha asked for me by name. Now you suggest that if I had been permitted to contest from my home, then I would not have voiced what I am voicing. What you are implying is that my protest is a small point.
Q. The Chief Minister says that you never approached her for Barmer.
A. She is factually wrong. It's insulting to suggest because there is a history behind her becoming CM and I've had a role to play... Did she have the courtesy of asking? I didn't ask her. I have spoken about all this. To her also.
Q. Is there is a conspiracy behind denying you the seat?
A. There is a larger issue. Why has Barmer, an outpost, become so important. Why did a Congress castaway, Colonel Sona Ram, come to BJP? Is there some sudden money in this constituency? I don't think you should go beyond asking this question, because this will explode sooner or later.
Q. Are there monetary gains involved?
A. I do not want to go further except say that very large sums of money are involved... with oil. Oil is a corrupting influence all over the world. The apprehension was that I would be a spoiler of that game. This is not an empty notion. This is what the whole world thinks. This is what a prominent leader of BJP thinks.

Q. Have there been attempts to get you to change your stance on Barmer?
A. Of course not. Because people know me in the BJP.
Q. Feelers from RSS?
A. RSS? Come on!
Q. Have the leaders in BJP become portable? It happened with Advani, Murli Manohar. 
A. This party is no longer fit to govern India. That is the reality. If you are herded like cattle... I don't understand it.
Q. This was going to be your last Lok Sabha battle. Is it a fight for your honour?
A. Of course it is. A lot of people ask, "what if you lose?" At least I'm going to lose from my home and lose an election against all odds: The Congress and BJP are against me, the Sangh will not speak up. You know who is standing up for me? The Muslims of my constituency. They see me as some kind of protector.
Q. Would you go back to BJP if you win?
A. What would I go back to BJP for? I have continued to ask of Advaniji, of Rajnath Singh, of Nitin, why did you all expel me? Not one person has replied. That discourtesy of expulsion deepened the discourtesy of not telling me why.
Q. But the party has not expelled you this time. There seems to be a deafening silence.
A. It's not a deafening silence. It's a selfdefeating silence. This was an opportunity for the party to establish a certain philosophy of functioning. And it appears as if they are now paralysed into inaction. A certain CM or a combine of chief ministers plus the party president decide not to allow me to contest from my home constituency. Why doesn't the media ask this of this Jaitley fellow? Why is he contesting from Amritsar? He lives and works in Delhi. He is originally from Jammu. So why is he not contesting from there?
It is one thing to contest from your home constituency. Vasundhara can't understand this. Not a single Muslim was present at Vasundhara's meetings but my meetings were flooded with Muslims. I stand for this kind of integrated society which is our historical inheritance. And BJP, with the politics it has followed with my candidature, is attempting to fracture this unique society.
Q. What did you tell Advani when you met him in Delhi on March 21?
A. I met him for 10-15 minutes. I didn't tell him I was going to file my nomination, just that "what I am about to do might lead to our parting of ways. I want to thank you for all the years of association we have had". "What's there to say?" he said. It was emotional. We've been together for 34 years.
To read more, get your copy of India Today here.

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bjp-is-no-longer-fit-to-govern-india-jaswant-singh/1/351685.html

MH370 may have silently glided to its death say pilots

India

North

Sandeep Unnithan  New Delhi, March 26, 2014 | UPDATED 22:46 IST

 

A Boeing 777-200 cockpit like Flight MH370. The centre pedestal with all flight communication is at the bottom of the picture, between both pilot seats.

A few Boeing 777 captains with a total of over 50,000 flying hours between them, met at a hotel in Chicago. The pilots from various airlines, on a layover between flights, could talk of nothing but the mystery of Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, an aircraft type they were proficient in. This was around the time when it was becoming clear that MH370 had likely crash landed in the Southern Indian Ocean and maritime patrol aircraft and warships extended their search into the remote stretches of this ocean.
Over several cups of coffee, they pieced together what they thought was the most likely scenario. One of the pilots present at the meeting, an Air India captain, recounted a likely sequence of events.

1) A fire broke out in the communications console of MH370. Called the Aft Control Stand or "Centre Pedestal"  it holds three Very High Frequency (VHF) sets, two High Frequency Sets (HF), a Transponder (a vital component of a radar based aircraft identification system), a Control Display Unit (CDU) that controls Satellite Telecommunications and a VHF Data Link Interface Unit. This is located between where the two pilots sit.
2) The fire short-circuited electronics and instantly severed all air-ground communication.
3) MH370's last reported voice exchange with Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control was abrupt and unusual. A voice identified as co-pilot's Fariq Abdul Rahman signed off with "All right, good night" at 1.09 am. It seemed to indicate something unusual had already begun to occur and his mind was pre-occupied with it. The normal communication would be: "Roger. Changing over to Ho Chi Minh Control on (the next frequency). Malaysian  370. Good night."
4) It is likely one of the pilots was away, perhaps in the toilet, when the fire broke out. (The fire extinguisher is situated behind the left seat, hence the copilot may have not been able to reach across to it in time, while he was seated and strapped to the right seat).
5) The pilots would have immediately pulled out the Quick Donning Oxygen Masks(QDM) situated an arms length away on either side, that are specially designed for emergency use but the use of pure oxygen near a cockpit fire may have actually exacerbated the situation.
6) They would have followed the The Standard Operating Procedure in an emergency by vacating the active airway and making an immediate turn towards the nearest suitable airfield and to  follow the golden thumb rule of  "Aviate (control the aircraft) Navigate (fly towards the intended path) and Communicate (to air traffic control)". This could explain the left turn, they were attempting to reach the nearest airfield, in this case either Langkawi or back to Kuala Lumpur.
7) It is possible that they failed to put the fire out and were likely overwhelmed by the fire, smoke or invisible toxic fumes and knocked unconscious before they could land the aircraft.
8) The cabin crew and the passengers would have been totally unaware of this emergency. This explains why no passenger tried to operate their cellphones while the aircraft flew over Malaysia and the late night timing of the flight would  have meant that most passengers were fast asleep. There are no cameras fitted in the cockpit. The cabin crew would not have been able to see the blazing inferno inside and the intercom system in the cockpit is situated in the same centre pedestal that was probably on fire. Hence, the crew would not be have been able to contact the pilots on the intercom system either.
9) The pilot-less plane continued flying south on a steady heading on its autopilot system until it ran out of fuel which is another six hours. By the time the cabin crew may have realised something was amiss and tried to open the cockpit door by using a secret code, the Door Locking System may have either failed (since major components are situated in the cockpit aft aisle stand) or there was very little the cabin crew could do, except to look on helplessly, far away from land and over a remote ocean with no cell phone network anywhere in the vicinity.
10) This particular flight would typically have had a fuel endurance of around seven hours. This would have included fuel to fly from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, a small percentage of this as enroute contingency and approximately additional one and a half hours of additional fuel (about one hour for a diversion to another airfield and another half hour of fuel for holding or circling above the alternate airport).
11) When it finally ran out of fuel, MH370's two gigantic turbofan engines, each capable of producing an enormous 100,000 pounds of thrust, flamed out one by one. Yet the aircraft continued gliding as it approached the ocean. The highly sophisticated Thrust Asymmetry Compensator (TAC) and  Automatic Flight Director System (AFDS) would ensure that the aircraft maintained a steady course and did not stall and fall from the  sky but descended gradually at a minimum control speed. This would result in a glide with a relatively shallow descent.
12) Depending on its final cruising altitude the death glide continued for the final miles till the aircraft finally hit the water. The impact may not have been severe enough, which meant the Emergency Location Transmitter, that activates beyond a certain force of impact,did not deploy. Or even if it did , the signals or "Pings" would have been too weak to detect , given the remote location of the crash site ,the enormous depth of the ocean and the rugged mountainous  terrain under water.

For more news from India Today, follow us on Twitter @indiatoday and on Facebook atfacebook.com/IndiaToday
For news and videos in Hindi, go to AajTak.in. ताज़ातरीन ख़बरों और वीडियो के लिए आजतक.इन पर आएं.

 

DO YOU LIKE THIS STORY?  21  6

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mh370-missing-malaysian-plane-reasons-for-its-disappearance/1/351364.html

Indian Navy headless as Chinese submarines prowl Indian Ocean

UNDATED FILE PHOTO OF A SHANG CLASS SSN.

A Chinese nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) made its first declared operational patrol for two months in the Indian Ocean. The Foreign Affairs Office of China's Ministry of Defence informed India's military attache in Beijing of the deployment on December 3 last year "to demonstrate respect for India."

Top secret intelligence assessments preapared by R&AW and Naval Intelligence terms, term the two-month deployment of the Shang class SSN between December 13,2013 and February 12, 2014, as 'seriously aggravating India's security concerns'.

India's security establishment is still assessing the impact of the deployment that comes at a time when the Indian Navy has been headless for over three weeks. Defence Minister AK Antony swiftly accepted Admiral DK Joshi's resignation on February 26-he quit owing moral responsibility for a string of naval accidents - but is yet to appoint his successor.

The assessements circulated among the highest levels of India's security establishment last month, predict the Chinese SSN patrol will be followed by the deployment of a Carrier Battle Group (CBG) in two or three years.

Intelligence reports say the Chinese deployment aims to 'demonstrate its ability to protect its interests in Africa and West Asia as well as Sea Lanes of Communications' and 'to send a message of persuasion to Indian Ocean Rim States.'

Naval sources say the Shang class submarine left its bastion on Hainan island in the South China Sea on December 3. Ten days later, on December 13, the SSN reached the Gulf of Aden via the Ombai Wetar Straits near Indonesia. It remained on patrol in the area for nearly two moths. China has deployed two warships on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden region since 2008.

The deployment of the submarine armed with land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles and torpedoes, has ominous consequences for the Indian Navy's ability to project power into the Indian Ocean. The navy considers the region it considers its primary sphere of influence but suffers from a short-legged undersea fleet. Only seven of India's fleet of 13 conventionally powered submarines are operational. One Kilo class submarine exploded and sank in Mumbai harbour on August 14 last year. The navy operates a solitary Akula class SSN, INS Chakra, leased from Russia in 2012.

The Arihant, the first of three indigenously built nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is yet to commence sea trials, five years after it was launched. The government is yet to okay a 2010 proposal by the navy to build a fleet of four indigenous SSNs to escort the Arihant SSBNs and protect Indian aircraft carriers.

"China has credibly demonstrated a formidable capability in our backyard," says Vice Admiral KN Sushil, veteran submariner and former Southern Naval Command chief. "We are yet to sail the Arihant, we are nowhere near starting our own SSN programme and we have no strategic capability yet to deter China."

Vice Admiral Sushil says the deployment of SSN screens with the Chinese CBGs will give the Chinese "awesome power" and seriously challenge the Indian Navy's sea control strategy.

China's Ministry of Defence informed five other nations- the United States, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Russia - of the submarine's deployment in December. Naval officials say this was done possibly to prevent adverse reactions in case their SSN encountered technical problems. Older Chinese 'Han' class SSNs have been plagued by reactor troubles. Analysts say the glitch-free deployment of the submarine seems to indicate the Chinese have overcome the reactor troubles in the Shang class. China has two Shang class second-generation boats and is building four more.

For

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-indian-ocean/1/350498.html

Archive

DEFENCE

March 31, 2014

Hidden dragon on the high seas

Hidden Dragon on the high seas: China's deployment of a nuclear-powered attack submarine in the Indian Ocean sign als the beginning of its strategic encirclement of India

Sandeep Unnithan  March 21, 2014 | UPDATED 16:05 IST

 

On December 8 last year, India's military attache in Beijing hurried out of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence and drove to the embassy at Chaoyang. The Brigadier-ranked officer was bearing an urgent message: China has just deployed, for the first time ever, a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) in the Indian Ocean. The submarine, the officer had been told, had sailed out a few days earlier to help with the People Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden and Beijing was now informing New Delhi of it "to demonstrate respect for India". The news triggered alarm in the highest echelons of India's security establishment; Beijing, it seemed, had finally put steel into the string of pearls, a network of Chinese-built naval bases ringing India that stretch from Myanmar and Sri Lanka in the east to Pakistan in the west. Reports by RAW, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the Directorate of Naval Intelligence warned the government that the deployment, "seriously aggravates India's security concerns".

Shang-class SSNs at the PLA Navy base in Hainan Island

Though Beijing claimed the Shang-class SSN was part of a routine anti-piracy patrol-it returned to its base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea on February 20 after two months in the Indian Ocean-New Delhi read more sinister motives. "Nuclear-powered attack submarines don't take part in anti-piracy patrols," a senior government official tells india today. Naval analysts predict it is a precursor to the deployment of a full-scale carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean. The battle group, a mobile force comprising attack submarines, warships, tankers and troop ships, will be centred around two aircraft carriers currently under construction. Retired Rear-Admiral Raja Menon says as much. "It was a reconnaissance probe, the prelude to a full-scale deployment."
Breathing Fire
If, rather when, this happens, it will pose a direct threat to India's security and economic interests. India claims the region between the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Straits as within its sphere of influence, one that is vital for its maritime commerce as 80 per cent of the country's energy supplies, about 3.86 million barrels of crude oil per day, pass through it. And it's largely to secure these waters that the Navy has for years been demanding 25 per cent of the defence budget-it now gets 17 per cent-to acquire aircraft, warships and submarines. Naval planners dismiss speculation that this demand is driven by a desire to move into the South China Sea and emphasise that the navy "has neither the capability nor the intent" to do so. "The Indian Ocean remains our primary focus," says a senior official in the defence ministry.
Shift in balance of power?
Now, the Chinese have sailed in and altered the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Unlike conventional submarines, nuclear-powered submarines such as the Shang-class boats can operate submerged and almost undetected. Sailing at over 30 knots, they can attack warships, merchant vessels and use cruise missiles to hit targets on land. Chinese SSNs in the Indian Ocean can, thus, wreak havoc with India's naval plans, which rely mainly on a fleet of conventional diesel-electric submarines that are limited by range, endurance and size. A fleet of four such boats on a 'barrier patrol' can choke India's energy supplies, isolate the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and threaten the INS Vikramaditya carrier battle group. They can even impede deployment of the slower Arihant nuclear submarines from their base in Visakhapatnam into the Bay of Bengal and beyond. "India has no strategic capability yet to deter China," says retired Vice-Admiral K.N. Sushil, veteran submariner and former Southern Naval Command chief. "We are yet to sail the Arihant and are nowhere near starting our own SSN programme. We will, therefore, be self-deterred and without the capability to retaliate."

This despite the fact that deployment of the Chinese SSN in India's backyard was not entirely unexpected. Naval watchers were well aware of the three-phase strategy of military expansion, propounded by PLA Navy chief Admiral Liu Huaqing in the late 1980s-upgrade the navy into a blue water force or one capable of operating beyond territorial waters; deploy in the Indian Ocean between 2011 and 2020; and undertake global operations sometime between 2021 and 2049. The PLA Navy has since advanced this timeframe. Using piracy as an excuse, it has deployed warships to protect its merchant vessels and sailors in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. "For China, piracy has come as a huge opportunity," an Indian admiral told india today late last year. "Now they will continue their deployments on some pretext or the other."
No success
No wonder, the mood in the Indian naval headquarters in South Block has turned from bluster to bewilderment. That China's move comes amid a crisis in the Indian Navy has only made matters worse. The Navy is headless since Admiral D.K. Joshi quit on February 26 in the wake of a string of accidents beginning with the August 14, 2013, destruction of the submarine INS Sindhurakshak. The government has dithered over choosing Joshi's successor. The Navy's submarine arm is in a rut. It has not acquired a new conventional undersea platform in 14 years and just half its fleet of 13 ageing conventional submarines are operational. It operates a solitary nuclear-powered attack submarine, the INS Chakra leased from Russia in 2012, even as it struggles to put the first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine to sea. And this is not for want of funds. The country has spent more than $6 billion over the past decade on building conventional and nuclear submarines. But the project has been crippled by a lack of long-term strategic vision within the Navy, and bureaucratic delays.
All at sea

Months before the INS Sindhurakshak exploded and sank in Mumbai harbour, the navy had proposed life-extension of its fleet of 14 submarines. Refits would extend lives of older submarines by seven years-a submarine has an average life span of 25 years-but this plan is yet to be approved. Even if the upgrade rolls out, it will come with disadvantages: A refurbished submarine will be available only 10 days a month while as a new boat is available for 20 days. New submarines are what the Navy doesn't have. The six Scorpenes bought from France in 2005 were to join the fleet in 2012 but "procedural delays in financial sanctions" caused by the bureaucracy have delayed induction till at least 2017. The shrinking fleet, meanwhile, has led to a glut of personnel. If 150 officers manned 12 submarines a decade ago, there are 700 officers for seven operational submarines now. Submariners thus have to contend with shorter sea tenures, which adversely impacts their training and efficiency. Besides, such worries may have clouded assessment of the looming threat from China and, worse, even injected a sense of complacency.
In contrast, China has embarked on the world's largest military expansion. Only last week, it increased its defence budget by 12.2 per cent from last year to $40 billion-the actual budget may be 40 per cent higher-to fund, among other things, construction of a fleet of over 20 nuclear-powered attack submarines. On the other hand, India will spend $6 billion on defence this year. Still some in India's defence establishment are not worried. A senior submariner says he is unruffled by PLA Navy's SSN deployments because "their reliability to deploy beyond their submarine bases is not established yet. There's a question mark on the ability of their SSNs to operate unhindered."
That may be so. But it's nobody's case that India can afford to be lax as for as defence preparedness goes. The country has struggled with a three-decade-old project to field a small force of three indigenous 6,000-tonne nuclear-powered submarines fitted with nuclear missiles. The first submarine, Arihant, was launched in 2009 but is yet to begin sea trials. The government is also yet to clear a classified 2010 naval proposal to build a fleet of four vessels like the Shang-class SSNs. The navy, meanwhile, is pushing hard to get more conventional submarines -top of its list are six Project 75 'India' submarines, which come at Rs.3,000 crore a piece and are bigger than the Scorpenes-never mind they will have limited utility against Chinese SSNs. The proposal has been blocked by the finance ministry citing the exorbitant cost. In all, the Navy wants to add 24 conventional submarines to its fleet, at a cost of Rs.76,000 crore.
This makes little sense to analysts such as Rear Admiral Menon, who say the navy must scrap all its plans for conventional submarines and remake itself into an all-nuclear navy like those of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. What's the Navy thinking on this? A naval officer says the changing strategic scenario in the Indian Ocean could force them into leasing a second nuclear-powered attack submarine. Just another tactical response to another strategic problem.
Follow the writer on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan
To read more, get your copy of India Today here.

For more news from India Today, follow us on Twitter @indiatoday and on Facebook atfacebook.com/IndiaToday
For news and videos in Hindi, go to AajTak.in. ताज़ातरीन ख़बरों और वीडियो के लिए आजतक.इन पर आएं.

 

DO YOU LIKE THIS STORY?  1  0

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-nuclear-powered-attack-submarine-south-china-sea/1/350573.html

The guilty men of 1962

India

Henderson Brooks report lists the guilty men of 1962

Sandeep Unnithan  New Delhi, March 18, 2014 | UPDATED 17:46 IST

 

A file photo of Australian author and journalist Neville Maxwell.

For over a half-century, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report has remained a state secret. The only two copies of the 1963 report that clinically analysed independent India's worst military defeat, at the hands of the PLA in 1962, lay buried in the vaults of the defence ministry and army headquarters. Successive governments stubbornly refused to release it.
On Thursday, a 190-page document surfaced, ghost-like, from the past. Australian author and journalist Neville Maxwell uploaded a portion of the Henderson Brooks report on the internet. Maxwell was the India correspondent of the Times, London, in New Delhi during the war. Government officials who had read the Henderson Brooks report instantly recognised its distinctive outlines in Maxwell's racy account India's China War released in 1970.Read:  Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report
On March 17, Maxwell ended speculation about whether he actually owned a copy of the report. His report, only a portion of the Henderson Brooks report, triggered a nation-wide download frenzy among the security establishment and  journalists. Marked 'Top Secret' the pages are the most severe indictment of independent India's political and military leadership ever. Over 2,000 Indian soldiers died in the month-long war which began in October 21, 1962. Over 4,000 were taken prisioners of war which saw an entire division of over 15,000 soldiers retreat ignominously in the face of the Chinese onslaught in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
The defence ministry refused to comment and responded with a terse statement stating the "extremely sensitive nature of the contents of the Report, which are of current operational value" as being reason for it to be Top Secret still. As the frayed typewritten pages now tell us, General Henderson Brooks held practically the entire civil and military leadership responsible for plunging India into a war it was not prepared for.

A file photo of former Defence Minister Krishna Menon.

 1)   Krishna Menon,Defence Minister: Brooks mentions as 'surprising' the defence minister's decision not to keep minutes to be taken of all the meetings he had with the military leadership ahead of the 1962 War. It led to  'grave consequences' he said, because it absolved anyone in the ultimate analysis of the responsibility of any major decision. Thus it could, and did, lead to decisions being taken without careful and considered thought on the consequences of those decisions.'
2)   BM Mullick, Director Intelligence Bureau: Brooks is scathing in his indictment of Mullick and the Intelligence Bureau for intelligence which was 'haphazardly collected, badly processed, unimaginatively put across and inefficiently disseminated.'  'It appears that the DIB was of the opinion that the 'Chinese would not react to our establishing of new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.' The IB slept through Chinese preparedness on the border. 'No notice was taken of the carefully assessed build up brought out in 1960 and 1961, but reliance was placed on verbal interpretation by the Director of Intelligence Bureau of his assessment based on isolated cases.' Mullick, Brooks says, even advised on tactical military matters.
3)   Lt General BM Kaul, Chief of General Staff and later Commander 4 Corps: Brooks reserves his anger for Kaul who he indirectly blames for the Indian army's complete rout in the eastern sector. 'So far effort has been made to keep individual personalities out of the review. General Kaul, however, must be made an exception, as, from now on, he becomes the central figure in the operations.' Brooks castigates Kaul, who as Chief of General Staff set up impossible targets for the troops on the ground. As the CGS, General Kaul also bought into the government's myth that the Chinese would not react to the forward policy. Kaul took over the reins of a newly constituted 4 Corps in NEFA (present Arunachal Pradesh) leaving the post of CGS vacant. The reason behind forming the 4 Corps was to enable General Kaul and his key staff officers to direct a quick operation. 'No one with any military knowledge would have form or accept a Corps to direct a major operation on the day of its inception.'
4)   MJ Desai, Foreign Secretary: At a meeting in the defence minister's room on September 22, 1962, Desai said that the Chinese would not react to the Indian forward policy but would perhaps, capture 'one or two posts.'

A file photo of Brigadier DK Palit.

5)   Brigadier DK Palit, Director Military Operations: 'The Director of Military Operations as late as August 1962 openly declared at headquarters 4 Infantry Division that the Chinese would not react and were not in a position to fight.'
The missing PM and Army Chief
The report is silent on the role played by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and army chief General VM Thapar. Partly because, the brief before the Henderson Brooks committee was to examine the military aspects of the operation. Nehru and Thapar, were, ironically, the ones who suffered the most from the debacle. General Thapar resigned as army chief on November 22, 1962, a day after the Chinese announced a ceasefire. Nehru whose forward policy was a strategic blunder, died a broken man two years after the defeat.

Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru

1)   Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister: The report is silent on the PM's role but it questions Nehru's 'Forward Policy' by which the Indian army would move ahead of the 3000 km MacMohan Line, separating India and China. Brooks says he does not know the background of the government's decision because he does not have the minutes of the meeting where the forward policy was laid out.

A file photo of General V M Thapar.

2)   General VM Thapar, Chief of Army Staff: The army chief is mentioned only in one place in the report where he is part of a meeting in Krishna Menon's office. General Thapar says that the Chinese could retaliate to the forward policy in Ladakh and capture an army post in the Galwan valley and reach their 1960 claim line.

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/the-guilty-men-of-1962-india-china-war-jawahar-lal-nehru-krishna-menon/1/350080.html

Archive

Special Report

March 17, 2014

The worst defence minister ever

The worst defence minister ever: AK Antony's tenure, the longest for a defence minister, has seen scams, crises, unpreparedness

Sandeep Unnithan  March 7, 2014 | UPDATED 10:45 IST

 

Two years ago, an outraged vice-admiral strode into Defence Minister A.K. Antony'swood-panelled office on thefirst floor of South Block. Hewanted to know why Antony had signed on a policy that would exclude submariners and aviators from holding the top job in the Navy. It would make submariners and aviators second-class citizens and destroy recruitment, he warned. Antony, the vice-admiral recalls, held his head in his hands and sank into his chair. He later struck the policy down. But he had exposed his embarrassing cluelessness at what he had almost allowed.

As the UPA slips into the twilight of a decade-long tenure, its lead actors examine legacies and worry how historians will judge them. None, with the possible exception of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, will leave a legacy as bitterly questioned as Defence Minister A.K. Antony.
Discontent at the top
Under Antony's seven-and-a-half-year tenure, the longest for an Indian defence minister, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has lurched from one crisis to another. The most visible have been the controversies over the service chiefs.
General V.K. Singh, who took the Government to the Supreme Court in 2012; former air chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi, who was chargesheeted by CBI in 2013 for accepting bribes; and Navy chief Admiral D.K. Joshi, who quit in ignominy after a spate of warship accidents, beginning with the August 14, 2013 destruction of a submarine as well as deaths of 18 of its crew, and the February 26 fire onboard another submarine that killed two officers. "This is a record of infamy which the UPA and the defence minister will carry as a burden for as long as their sensibilities are able to recognise what great wrong they have done to India," says former BJP defence minister Jaswant Singh. His party renewed calls for Antony's resignation after the Navy chief quit on February 26.

The February 17 decision to award nearly 2.5 million retired servicemen 'one rank, one pension'-for which Antony claimed credit-has come after seven years of such bitter rancour, with veterans handing in their medals, that it is unlikely to benefit UPA in the forthcoming General Elections.
"Antony is an honest but soft and indecisive minister, exceedingly misguided by lower-level functionaries of the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW). His tenure also saw the filing of appeals by the Ministry of Defence in the Supreme Court against grant of benefits to disabled soldiers, all approved by him on file," says Major Navdeep Singh, advocate, Punjab and Haryana High Court.
The divide between the 1.4 million men in uniform and the civilians who run the defence ministry has never been greater. Antony outmanoeuvred those who advocated defence reforms to promote synergy in civil-military functioning by setting up the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2011. "He reiterated the old line of permanent chairman, chiefs of staff, requiring political consensus but has not convened even one all-party meeting in seven years to push for it," says Anit Mukherjee, a military analyst with the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Slowdown in decision-making
In his memoirs Duty, former US defence secretary Robert Gates notes the greatest challenge faced by a secretary of defence is the crushing impact of "dealing with multiple problems daily, pivoting on a dime every few minutes from one issue to another… and then making decisions, always with too little time and too much ambiguous information".
Under Antony, decision-making in the ministry has slowed to a crawl. It has had catastrophic consequences for defence preparedness, with India's military machine-still equipped with tanks, fighter jets and warships acquired mostly in the 1980s-in limbo. Howitzers have not been bought since 1987, new submarines have been delayed by over five years and fighter jet proposals are pending since 1999. The $100-billion list of pending military requirements may take over a decade to be met. This is why Rear Admiral (retired) K. Raja Menon calls Antony the "worst defence minister ever".
Crucial reforms such as the appointment of a chief of defence staff (now watered down to a permanent chairman chiefs of staff committee) to enable the services to pool resources and fight jointly as well as proposals to give the private sector a level-playing field with the public sector in defence production, have been shelved. "Nobody has anything bad to say about Antony the person," says Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, "but he simply lacks the connect at the policy and the strategic level". Antony's lack of vision, his inability to see over the horizon, to demand accountability and insist on deadlines stands in sharp contrast to that of his predecessors.
George Fernandes, during his tenure in NDA between 1998 and 2004, and Pranab Mukherjee from 2004 to 2006, ran the ministry on a tight leash and delicately balanced civil-military relations. Fernandes posted his bureaucrats to Siachen. An official recalls how a bureaucrat collapsed after a verbal barrage from Mukherjee. Antony's reliance on the bureaucracy has rankled the military. A crucial file for dredging the sensitive Mumbai harbour was held up for four years. It resulted in the grounding of one submarine, INS Sindhughosh, in January this year. Nobody was punished for the delay.
Defence officials deny this charge and credit Antony with undertaking the largest-ever expansion of the armed forces-adding 28 ships in seven years, inducting two nuclear submarines, okaying a Rs.65,000-crore Mountain Strike Corps comprising 40,000 soldiers along the disputed border with China; inducting C-17 strategic airlift aircraft and basic trainers for the air force. Officials blame the forces for procurement delays. "Army was given two chances in seven years to buy 197 light helicopters, they deviated from procedures both times. We simply cannot clear it," an MoD official says.
The scam stain
Less than a week after the scandal caused by the navy chief's resignation, a new scam hit South Block. On March 2, the defence ministry announced it was handing over complaints of bribery in the procurement of Rolls-Royce engines by the public sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, to the CBI. The armed forces braced for the impact of another scandal on its military preparedness: Rolls-Royce engines power over 100 fighter, transport and trainer aircraft in the Army and Navy. The blow of defence scandals has often landed on the ruling government.
Antony's real mandate was to prevent these scandals from doing a Bofors on UPA. His defenders like to say that "behind his unassuming demeanour is an uncompromising value system which comes down heavily when irregularities are detected in defence deals". But Antony's zero tolerance for corruption has not prevented a string of corrupt defence deals. In January, the ministry terminated a $556.26-million deal for 12 VVIP helicopters from AgustaWestland. The scandal followed allegations of bribery in the purchases of Tatra trucks and irregularities in the purchases of light utility helicopters.
Hollow indigenous capability
Antony's socialist leanings, his refusal to reform the defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUS) and suspicion of the private sector, may be the root cause of the failure of indigenous defence capability to meet India's requirements.
India's gigantic but creaky military-industrial complex, a network of 39 ordnance factories, three defence shipyards, eight defence PSUs and 52 DRDO laboratories has been unable to produce new hardware, leaving the services importing 60 per cent of their military needs from abroad. "When Antony took over, India was the sixth largest importer of arms and China was the largest arms importer," says a private sector CEO who does not want to be named. "In less than a decade, India has become the world's largest arms importer and China has become the world's fifth largest arms exporter."
Deeply aware of his shortcomings, Antony recently indicated he would not like to continue as defence minister after the UPA's term ends. It may have been the closest he may have come to admitting that, perhaps, he may not have been the right man for the job.
Followthe writer on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/ak-antony-defence-minister-scams-upa-ii/1/347190.html

Why the UPA's tenure has damaged India's defence