Monday 28 December 2015

Netaji's revenge


The dominant narrative of India’s freedom struggle has been that it was achieved through non-violence. This account has remained unquestioned despite a hellish follow-through of Partition, which led to the largest mass migration in human history and the deaths of between 200,000 and 500,000 persons.
Was this pacifist narrative also why historians consigned Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s legacy to calendar art? The figure in military fatigues, breeches and Gandhi glasses but not the architect of Free India’s first army, the Azad Hind Fauj drafted from British Indian army soldiers captured by the Japanese. Indian historians parroted the line of how Bose was a ‘misguided patriot’ partly because he allied with the Axis powers—Germany’s Adolf Hitler and Japan’s Hideki Tojo. Historians however, underestimated the critical role Bose had played in shaking the unwavering faith of the British in their most powerful instrument of control over the sub-continent—the Indian army.
This forgotten freedom fighter returned this year but not how his admirers, sceptical of his demise, would have wanted him to.
INDIA TODAY took a close look at recently declassified files from the West Bengal state archives and discovered a shocking political secret. The Bose family had been under intensive surveillance by the Intelligence Bureau for over two decades. What made this snooping even more egregious was that the surveillance was authorized by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Netaji’s colleague in the freedom  movement. The revelations led to renewed interest in the legacy of a forgotten freedom fighter, not the least of which are tour companies in Kolkata offering a Netaji tour circuit. More tangibly, the issue has lent fresh urgency to the issue of declassifying thousands of classified ‘Netaji Files’ still with the central government and the West Bengal government. Most of these files contain material thrown up by inquiries into his mysterious disappearance in August 1945. Two of the three probes ordered by the government believe he died in an air crash in Taiwan. A third, in 2006, refused to believe the air crash theory. But as we now know, the files also contained the politically  embarrassing secrets of a rigorous surveillance by the Indian secret services, that is now out for historians to study. What other secrets the files hold will be known only next year. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met and assured Bose family members and assured them that the files would be declassified— beginning with the freedom fighter’s birth anniversary, January 23 ,2016. But it was West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee who acted first. In September, Banerjee declassified all the files and transferred them to the police museum. The assembly elections in West Bengal, just months away, were doubtless, a powerful incentive for her to reclaim the icon.


--Sandeep Unnithan.

Friday 25 December 2015

Anti-terror grid in deep freeze

Anti-terror grid in deep freeze

Seven years after 26/11, a series of intelligence-sharing databases that could prevent another terror strike are yet to get off the ground-an ominous reality given the recent Paris attack.

November 25, 2015 | UPDATED 15:07 IST 
CCTNS envisages computerising nearly 15,000 police stations nationwide. Photo: Vikram Sharma
In the weeks after the November 26, 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, India's stunned secu-rity establishment went into a huddle. No accountability was fixed for some particularly egregious intelligence lapses, such as the Indian Navy disregarding an Intelligence Bureau (IB) alert about a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) vessel. An LeT mole, David Coleman Headley, breezed in and out of the country at will, without ever being questioned. Even as the government rapidly expanded its counter-terrorism response unit, the National Security Guard, into four metro hubs, it looked for a raft of new measures among which were those to swiftly disseminate intelligence across agencies to warn of another terrorist attack.
The acronyms and capabilities of this three-stage transition to a smart counter-terror network were formidable - the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) would seamlessly connect all of India's over 14,000 police stations; the National Intelligence Grid or NATGRID would link up civilian databases to give security organisations a 360° profile of suspects; and finally, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), a self-contained terrorism fighting machine.
Nearly seven years later, not one of these intelligence-sharing databases are a reality despite a budget of thousands of crores of rupees and a Rs 800 crore spend on the CCTNS. All the government has to show for itself are a mess of reports, proposals, committees, red tape, turf battles, and the mirage of a robust security architecture.
G.K. Pillai who steered all three projects as home secretary in 2009-2011 says the projects were on steam during then home minister P. Chidambaram's tenure but suffered from 'ownership issues' after he quit in 2012. Officials say that there is a silent battle on in government to restore this architecture, but take it away from the home ministry and place it under the intelligence agencies.
On November 18, just five days after Islamic State (IS) terrorists killed 130 people in Paris, the government proved the truism that all reform in India is crisis-driven. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, headed by Prime Minister Modi, fast-tracked a Rs 2,000-crore CCTNS proposal. The network will now be completed by March 2017, government officials promised.
SLOW-TRACK CCTNS
The CCTNS had its origins in a PolNet system conceived in the late 1990s to link police stations. PolNet never took off. Neither, for that matter, has its successor, the CCTNS, announced after the 26/11 attack. "It is preposterous that 18 years later we don't have the simple network for police stations to share information," says Ajai Sahni, executive director of the Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management. "The government is still quarrelling over the architecture of the system with the private vendor that is developing it."
The CCTNS envisages fully computerising about 14,324 police stations and about 5,000 offices of supervisory police officers across the country. The project's initial completion date was to be March 2012 but implementation related issues pushed the deadline to 2015. Last year, the CCTNS was merged with an umbrella scheme for modernisation of the police and other forces. Subsequently, the umbrella scheme itself was dropped and this year, no funds were allocated for the scheme.
Meanwhile, the home ministry is coordinating CCTNS with the states to discuss linking up their databases even as various problems have cropped up, say officials who attended these meetings. Project implementation is at an advanced stage in all states except Bihar and Rajasthan. Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Telangana and Tamil Nadu use their own software which is funded by the CCTNS project. This commonality of software has caused problems for integration of databases, say government officials, because the databases are not compatible with each other.
States such as Odisha complained that First Information Reports (FIRs) were being registered online only in 300 of their 561 police stations because of uncertain power supply and hardware repair issues. Several states such as Jharkhand complained of slow internet speeds. The states wanted the broadband speeds to be raised from 512 kbps to 2 mbps, which now means fresh contracts need to be drawn up between Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and the state governments.
"We should have followed a top-down approach, rolling out various phases of the project, but we have instead gone for a bottom-up approach," says a government official privy to the discussions.
State governments want a five-year funding support from the Centre to continue the programme. Only six states have so far implemented the CCTNS network in all police stations.
This is just the modest first stage of getting all police stations to file FIRs online. After this begins the challenge of integrating state databases with central servers and then the second phase with new features such as mobile applications, fingerprint identification systems and an integration with the Integrated Criminal Justice System, a comprehensive database of courts, prisons and forensic evidence.
At an October 16 meeting of secretaries of various agencies connected with the project departments, the finance and the home ministries debated on the fine print-over whether CCTNS was a centrally sponsored scheme or a centrally funded scheme, a reflection of the bureaucratisation of the security architecture.
GRIDLOCKED NATGRID
The NATGRID project had made little progress in the six years since it had been announced in 2009 and a high-profile CEO had been recruited from the private sector. In May last year, the government decided not to extend the contract of its CEO Raghu Raman. However, in May this year, it decided to breathe life into the catatonic project, appointing Ashok Prasad, special secretary (internal security) in the home ministry, to head it. In October, the government put the National Informatics Centre in charge of executing the project and appointed four sub-committees to head different aspects.

Illustration by Saurabh Singh

 
It was a curious turn of fortune for a UPA-era scheme, the brainchild of then home minister P. Chidambaram. NATGRID synergised private sector strengths to do for counter-terrorism what Nandan Nilekani's Unique Identification Authority had done for the direct benefits scheme. The organisation submitted a 672-page detailed project report to the home ministry in November 2010, but this could not make much headway. The intelligence agencies, particularly the IB, saw NATGRID as an interloper and refused to back it. When Chidambaram demitted the home ministry for the finance ministry, the project lost an important votary. It went on the back burner.
The turf battles with other intelligence agencies continue who are loath to sharing information despite NATGRID officials' assurances that they were like "couriers who merely carried parcels from the sender to the recipient". "The agencies fear that NATGRID might become too powerful, that its users will have too much access to information and might even misuse it," says a senior government official.
Prasad revived the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) that operates under the IB in North Block. He is now being seen as a contender for the post of the NATGRID CEO after he retires on January 31 next year.
THE NCTC DILEMMA
It is with the NCTC that the NDA government is truly confronted with a dilemma. The government has the blueprint of an organisation it drew up in its first spell in power over a decade ago, but vociferously opposed while in the Opposition. In 2000, the Kargil Review Committee proposed a comprehensive overhaul of India's internal and external security. Significant recommendations of the Group of Ministers that examined the report in 2001 included the creation of the NCTC and the MAC. The MAC was to be the first step for intelligence agencies to share information; it would then be subsumed into the NCTC. The concept note for both was prepared by Ajit Doval, then additional director in the IB. The MAC was notified in December 2001 and Doval chaired the first meeting in February 2002.
The NCTC was envisaged as a comprehensive terror-fighting agency with separate arms for gathering, processing, analysing intelligence, and then acting on it. It was modelled on the National Counter terrorism Center of the United States. The MAC would form the nucleus of this new entity. But the near-defunct MAC stirred to life only six years later, after the 26/11 attack.
The agency was re-notified on December 31, 2008 and the first meeting chaired by newly appointed Home Minister P. Chidambaram on January 1, 2009. The MAC grew from a coordination centre where representatives of 25 Indian intelligence agencies shared information. The first meeting saw around a dozen pieces of information being shared. (This year, MAC meetings shared, on average, close to 200 pieces of intelligence.) Yet, there was no sign of the gigantic NCTC.
On February 3, 2012 the UPA government issued an executive order, a central counter-terrorism hub located within the IB. There was an immediate blowback from the states, particularly Opposition-ruled states such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal-which saw the NCTC's provisions to carry out operations across India as an attack on federalism and interference in law and order, a state subject.
The states did not look closely at the provisions of the notification which said that the Centre would act "with the assistance of the state police". The government went on the back foot but did not cancel the executive order, only holding it "in abeyance". So the NCTC is alive, if only on paper.
"The government faces a catch-22," says a senior intelligence official. "It cannot be seen as pushing for an agency it opposed while in the Opposition." Other informed sources say that the government plans to create a vast technical intelligence agency like the US National Security Agency. Agencies such as the NATGRID and Aviation Research Centre will be integrated into the National Technical Research Organisation.
"The requirements of a centralised platform to evolve better intelligence coordination and dissemination is indisputable whether it is embedded in the existing agencies such as the IB and Research & Analysis Wing or NATGRID. That is for the government to decide," says Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP and member of the parliamentary standing committee on defence. The trouble is, that could take years to be realised.
Follow the writer on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan

Saturday 21 November 2015

From Arab Spring to Islamist Winter

From Arab Spring to Islamist Winter

Al Qaeda, that led the Mali hotel siege, was strengthened by the collapse of Muammar Gadaffi’s Libya in 2011.

 |  4-minute read |   21-11-2015
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The attacks by an al Qaeda affiliate at the Radisson Blu luxury hotel in Africa exactly a week after the Paris terror attack could signal a curious rivalry between jihadist groups opposed to the West. Al Qaeda, the original fount of global jihad, signalling the upstart Islamic State which carried out the lethal Paris strikes, that it was still relevant.
Al Qaeda in West Africa, also known as al Mourabitoun is believed to be behind the nine-hour siege in Bamako which killed 27 persons. Al Mourabitoun has origins similar to that of the nefarious IS. Both originated in western-led interventions in Asia and Africa and were strengthened by the so-called Arab Spring. The Islamic State sprang out of the US-led coalition's destruction of Saddam Hussain's Iraq in 2003 when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi used disenchanted elements of Saddam's Baathist state-generals, spies and soldiers - and vast weapons caches to create his Sunni Arab "Caliphate" in July 2014.
Al Qaeda in Africa is also rooted in another equally disastrous western intervention - the overthrow of Muammar Gadaffi in 2011. The Libyan civil war was part of a so-called "Arab Spring" which began with civil unrest in Tunisia in 2010 and spread through Arab League countries. It turned into an Islamist Winter post 2012 when civil-war wracked countries like Syria became sanctuaries for terrorist groups like the IS and al Qaeda.
France under President Chirac wisely stayed away from the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq. Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France played an active role in the multi-national coalition force that bombed Libya in 2011, albeit under a UN Security Council mandate. I witnessed the consequences of this intervention firsthand over 2000km south of Libya's capital Tripoli in Chad last December. I was part of a small Indian press delegation witnessing France's intervention in Francophone Africa. Amidst the high-pitched roars of Rafale fighter jets, military officials briefed us on their war against a host of islamist groups reinvigorated by the collapse of Gadaffi's Libya.
Jihadist fires have simmered in Africa for decades. In 2005, the Algerian Salafi group for Call and Combat (GSPC) pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed itself the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Al-Mourabitoun, headed by a veteran jihadist fighter Mokhtar Belmokhtar, broke away from AQIM sometime in 2013. Just how these groups had revived to threaten fragile African countries, the UN Security Council committee grimly noted in a 2013 report:
"In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa," it said. "Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-state actors, including terrorist groups."
Flush with arms and ammunition from Libyan arsenals, jihadist groups captured vast swathes of north-eastern Mali in 2012 prompting French military intervention. Last January four Rafale jets flew 9.5 hours nonstop from their base in Saint-Dizier in southern France, topping up their planes five times, to bomb Jihadist forces as they encircled the town of Gao in Mali. This intervention was later succeeded by an ongoing Operation Barkhane (sand dune)- spread across Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkino Faso and Mauritania-the "G5" countries that make up the Sahelian belt, an area 10 times the size of France. More than 3,000 French military personnel backed by Rafale fighter jets, helicopter gunships and drones form the vanguard of a coalition fighting jihadi groups in the Sahel.
Libya, with its multiple armed conflicts, warlords and multiple militias continues to pose a challenge for them. In October 2014, an Islamic State affiliate took control of the eastern Libyan city of Derna, marking Libya's transition to Islamist Winter.
"Southern Libya is a large haven for terrorist armed groups who use it to rest, train, recruit and finance," a French military commander in N'Djamena rued. Intelligence-led military operation have intercepted hundreds of tons of weapon caches, most of it from Libyan arsenals, riding on Africa's old smuggling networks.
In August this year, Mokhtar Belmokhtar was named the head of al Qaeda in Western Africa, indicating why it may be too early to pronounce the demise of al Qaeda.
The core of al Qaeda's leadership headed by Ayman Al Zawahiri since the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden may have weakened and hiding in the Af-Pak region. But its affiliates like AQIM, al Muhajiroun, the al Nusra front in Syria and al Qaeda in Yemen continue to pose serious security challenges for the world. The Arab Spring was a short-lived phenomenon.
The Islamist Winter is likely to endure.

Wednesday 18 November 2015

India's new enemy

India's new enemy

The Paris attacks have raised the possibility of strikes on India by the IS. The security establishment is now looking for a raft of solutions.

November 18, 2015 | UPDATED 13:32 IST 
Protesters in Kashmir carry flags of the Islamic state
Protesters in Kashmir carry flags of the Islamic state. Photo: Abid Bhat
At a high-level intelligence-sharing meeting in Washington DC this June, senior US officials flagged the possibility of IS attacks to their Indian counterparts. India, they said, faced a "massive terrorist threat" from the Islamic State.
It was only the second instance that the IS had figured in the high-level intelligence meetings that begun with the US after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. Indian intelligence agencies, almost exclusively focused on the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan and the possibility of more Mumbai-style strikes, were not inclined to take the IS threat seriously then. Although the IS had attracted a handful of young Indian Muslims through a ferocious social media outreach, and had declared India to be part of the 'Khorasan province', covering Afghanistan and Pakistan, in IS propaganda, the group was largely seen as being a problem confined to West Asia.
That attitude changed swiftly after November 13. On November 16, three days after the Paris attacks, the home ministry issued a nationwide alert accepting that the terror group was expanding its arc beyond its core areas of Iraq and Syria. The IS, the alert states, has been piggybacking on terror groups operating in India, and that there is a high possibility of IS-sponsored terror attacks in the country.
"The whole world is under threat from the IS. It is a global challenge and we have to deal with it together," Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh told the media on November 17.
The home ministry has advised all states and union territories to take preventive measures around all foreign missions, tourist spots and community facilities frequented by foreigners. It has advised the review and strengthening of security facilities for foreign nationals from the US, UK, France, Russia, Israel, Turkey and Australia.
According to an Indian intelligence officer, India is in the second tier of countries on the list of IS targets-the West remains the terror organisation's primary target. "The IS has no cause to hit India at present, but they would like to carry out a major aggravating strike mainly to highlight our proximity to the United States and Israel," he says.
This is a near identical Indian security assessment of al Qaeda post the 9/11 attacks and also a reason the Mumbai attackers in 2008 targeted Israeli nationals.
IS, the successor to al Qaeda's apocalyptic legacy, has amplified the threat with its mastery of social media as a recruitment tool. It now presents a three-fold threat far greater than al Qaeda ever did in its heyday: lone wolf attacks carried out by self-radicalised youth, a Mumbai-style attack executed on Indian and foreign targets on Indian soil, and finally the possibility of an Indian militant group pledging allegiance to IS like groups such as Boko Haram have done.
A particular area of concern is J&K where the home ministry has warned of strikes. The security establishment is not alarmed by Kashmiri youths waving IS flags in downtown Srinagar, which is largely seen as attempts to get publicity. The real danger, a senior police officer in Srinagar warns, is the possibility of a breakaway Kashmiri militant group pledging allegiance to the IS. "It could get even more complicated if this group is recognised by IS as a so-called 'wilayat' (province). IS would then claim to have a presence in India," he says.
Terrorism experts say the advent of IS marks a new challenge since the 26/11 strikes because existing deficiencies in India's security architecture have not been fixed.
"We have not been able to distinguish between risk and vulnerability," says Ajai Sahni, executive director of the New Delhi-based Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. "Our vulnerabilities, post 26/11 continue because we have not addressed our policing capabilities. What fluctuates is the risk."
Self-radicalised recruits
In November 2014, Indian intelligence agencies were stunned by the return of Areeb Majeed, a 24-year-old youth from Kalyan, a Mumbai suburb. A civil engineering student, Majeed had accompanied three others from Kalyan to join the IS ranks in Syria. He told his police interrogators that he had been trained to become a suicide bomber by IS handlers, but disillusioned with the organisation, had returned. His three companions-Saleem Tanki, Fahad Sheikh and Aman Sheikh-are listed as missing, believed to be dead. Suddenly, Indian authorities realised that the world's third largest Muslim population was no longer insulated from the lure of pan-Islamic extremism.
One study by the British House of Commons Defence Committee released in February this year estimates that handles sympathetic to the organisation post about 90,000 tweets each day. Many recruiters actively solicit global recruits to come and fight in their 'Caliphate'. Virtually all the 20 or so Indians believed to have traveled to IS-held territories were radicalised through social media.
 
Saifuddin (name changed), a Hyderabadbased MBA, for instance says he got in touch with a person who identified himself as Mohammed-Ibn-Al Bara and claimed to be a Syria-born Australian citizen carrying out aid work in conflict-hit Syria. "He convinced me to join as a volunteer and asked me to reach Turkey and then cross over to Syria," he says. Saifuddin aborted his plan after policemen knocked on his door in August last year, a week before he was to leave for Turkey after getting a visa. He is now working as an independent foreign exchange trader.
The possibility of strikes by IS adds a new dimension to the problem of radicalised youth, particularly since the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) advisory warns that the organisation has been successful in radicalising youths and attracting locals in India and people from the Indian diaspora to participate in its activities.
India has virtually no intelligence-gathering on the IS and relies on secondary intelligence obtained from the US, Britain and Russia through information-sharing agreements.
"But it is not enough to know where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the IS leader, is-we must know what he and the leadership are thinking," one intelligence officer says. But such information is hard to come by. Government sources say the first steps towards establishing some intelligence-sharing capability were taken in June this year with the appointment of former Intelligence Bureau chief Asif Ibrahim as the Prime Minister's special envoy for counter-terrorism. Ibrahim is believed to have played a key role in obtaining the release of 46 Indian nurses held captive by the IS in the Iraqi city of Mosul last June.
The priority for both MHA and state home departments remains on how to firewall Indian Muslims from IS's notorious online reach.
The Telangana model
As a concrete step, the MHA held a meeting with the police of 12 vulnerable states on July 30 and discussed the problem of IS radicalisation. The approach discussed was a radical departure from simply jailing youths who wanted to join their ranks. Areeb Majeed is an exception, and remains lodged in Mumbai's Arthur Road Jail, because he actually took part in the fighting and was arrested by the NIA. He was later chargesheeted under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). The plan to tackle youth yet to travel to the IS is going to be counseling and de-radicalisation.
Perhaps the biggest catch for the Indian authorities since Majeed's return from the IS front was the arrest of Afsha Jabeen, 38, who was deported from the UAE and arrested on arrival in Hyderabad on September 11. According to the police, Jabeen has used the IS ideology to radicalise people and even convince non-Muslims to convert through Facebook groups, although she was not in touch with any IS leader and was only a motivator, not a recruiter.
The police say Jabeen, who earlier worked with a travel agency in UAE, began to get radicalised in 2008. Pregnant at the time, she watched videos on YouTube and read jihadi literature online. On Facebook groups, she reportedly urged young Indians to establish a Caliphate in India and wanted the ISIS supremo, Al Baghdadi, to be idolised by Muslims the world over. "She says she engaged people on Facebook groups to appreciate the supremacy of Islam," recalls a senior intelligence officer.
An MHA official says the case is slightly different in India: "Indian Muslims are temperamentally different from Muslims in West Asia or in Africa. The reasons for alienation and indoctrination that exist abroad are absent here." The MHA now wants the police of other states to emulate the example of Telangana State Police, which claims to have successfully prevented at least 16 potential IS recruits from joining the extremist organisation over the past one year.
Indian recruits to IS are still miniscule when compared to western nations. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) believes that up to 1,500 French nationals, 1,200 Russians, 600 British and German nationals make up an IS's foreign legion of nearly 20,000 fighters.

Protests outside Jamia Masjid, Srinagar, with Pakistan, IS and Lashkar flags. Photo: Abid Bhat

 
The counselling route
Banking on its earlier experience in weaning away some of those inspired by left-wing extremism, the Telangana Police follows what has until now turned out to be an effective plan to talk and walk back Muslim youth from the edge of sectarian extremism. It banks on counselling to win over the impressionable minds and victims of online radicalisation. This is also in consonance with the state government's softline approach in dealing with minority issues and handling those found sympathetic and supportive of the IS. Police officers keep a close and constant watch on internet users to track those attracted to IS ideology.
There are some hiccups in tracking social media accounts of potential suspects, they say, as Facebook, for one, is not consistent in granting access to profiles of potential recruits under investigation.
When such cases are spotted, the police act quickly. In the case of four youngsters, all in their early 20s trying to obtain Turkish visas, intelligence agencies were constantly monitoring them. After their visas got cancelled, the four planned to illegally cross over to Bangladesh where a handler promised to facilitate their travel to Turkey. They travelled from Karimnagar, near Hyderabad, to Kolkata by train last August. The Telangana police intercepted them in a Kolkata lodge.
All potential IS recruits stopped in their tracks have been put through counselling sessions. The police claim it has yielded positive results so far-those tracked and persuaded to change their minds are now either pursuing a professional career or continuing their studies. They refrain from browsing pro-ISIS websites. This is possible because inputs based on monitoring of radical social media platforms is shared with the local police and, in turn, elders in the family. If possible, local religious leaders are also roped in to make the recruits realise the futility of their misplaced idealism.
"We spend time to explain how their imagination is fired online by the exploits of so-called do-gooders and that a reality check would show it is a sour dream," a senior Telangana intelligence officer says about the counselling exercise. Experiences of ISIS survivors and returnees are also shared with potential recruits. "Education is a better alternative to enforcement because the learning of these impressionable minds is limited to social media exposure," says another intelligence officer. Counsellors interact with each individual directly as well as through those close to them who the police believe might convince these radical youths.
Some officers involved in the counter-radicalisation measures lament the lack of involvement of Muslims scholars and other opinion makers in Muslim society, and their negligible presence on social media to interpret Islam in its true light and explain to these radicalised youths its values.
Not everyone in the security and intelligence establishment approves of this strategy to neutralise an extremist ideology. Those opposed to it, particularly in the Intelligence Bureau, point out that like in the case of disillusioned or former Maoists cadres and sympathisers, those imbued by online Islamic radicalisation will eventually return to their erratic ways. They contend that the sway of extremist doctrines will not wear off unless these individuals are handheld into building careers because most of these people come from the rapidly emerging Muslim middle class with growing economic aspirations.
But, for now, the Telangana Police's model seems to have found more takers. Because, as the officers in Hyderabad say, the alternative-of doing nothing-is worse.
Follow the writers on Twitter @SandeepUnnithan and @AmarnathKMenon
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Tuesday 17 November 2015

Metrojet bombing the worst aviation security attack since 9/11

Metrojet bombing is the worst aviation security attack since 9/11

It was reminiscent of the 1985 attack on Air India’s 'Emperor Kanishka' which killed 329 people.

 |  3-minute read |   17-11-2015
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Russia’s head of security service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov confirmed that a “terrorist bomb” brought down the Metrojet Airbus A321 passenger jet over Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. The St Petersburg-bound aircraft crashed on the Sinai peninsula on October 31 after taking off from the Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheikh, killing all 224 passengers on board. The Islamic State's (ISIS) affiliate in the Sinai peninsula, through a statement, claimed to have downed the aircraft, though the group did not reveal its modus operandi. The ISIS claimed that the aircraft was downed in revenge for Russia’s bombing campaign against the ISIS which began on September 30.
It is still not clear whether the explosive was carried by a suicide bomber or in baggage checked into the aircraft. Reports on November 17 that Egyptian authorities had arrested two Sharm El-Shiekh airport employees points to the latter possibility.
This is the worst breach of aviation security since the September 11, 2001, or "9/11" terrorist attacks, in which 18 al-Qaeda hijackers commandeered passenger jets and flew them into US landmarks including the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon, killing 2,977 people.
The suspected modus operandi in the Metrojet bombing is in fact reminiscent of the June 23, 1985 bombing of Air India’s "Emperor Kanishka" which killed 329 people. The bomb planted onboard the aircraft by Babbar Khalsa militants in Toronto, exploded when the Delhi-bound jet was off the coast of Ireland. It was the worst terrorist strike in aviation history until the 9/11 attacks.
The ISIS’ claim of downing the Russian jet has now been corroborated by a Russian investigation where forensic scientists discovered traces of explosives in the aircraft wreckage. Bortnikov says a homemade explosive device weighing approximately 1 kg of TNT broke the aircraft up in midair and caused the debris to be scattered over a wide area.
Aviation security has seen an unprecedented surge after 9/11 with countries focusing on scanning passengers for explosives or weapons and also rehearsing scenarios for fighter jets to shoot down commandeered aircraft to prevent them from being used as flying missiles.
Attempts by terrorists to bring down airliners — prized as high-visibility targets — have continued. Until now, all of them were foiled. In December 2001, passengers overpowered "shoe bomber" Richard Reid as he attempted to light an explosive-packed shoe over an airliner. Attempts by al Qaeda terrorists to down an Israeli Boeing 757 chartered aircraft over Mombasa when the two Russian-built SA-7 "Strela" Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) missed the target. On December 25, 2009, alert passengers on an Amsterdam-Detroit flight overpowered Nigerian national Umar Farook Abdulmutallab, 24, as he attempted to light plastic explosives stuffed in his underwear. In November 2010, security offcials intercepted a colour printer rigged with explosives in the UK, bound on a trans-Atlantic cargo jet headed for the US.
Experts ruled out the possibility of Russian Metrojet aircraft being downed by a surface-to-air missile. The aircraft was flying at 30,000 feet well beyond the ceiling of most MANPADS available to terrorist groups.
Earlier, on November 2, US officials released infra-red satellite images to NBC News which showed a flash on the jet leading to speculation that it had been brought down by a bomb. The November 13, Paris attacks which killed 139 people has revived the spectre of highly coordinated Mumbai-style gun-and-bomb attacks. The downing of Russia’s Metrojet revives an older yet equally nefarious security threat.